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1Abstract
A group of risk-averse agents repeatedly produce a perishable consump-
tion good; individual outputs are observable but eﬀorts are not. The contract-
ing problem admits a recursive formulation, and the optimal value function is
the ﬁxed point of a contraction mapping. When the agents can be punished
to the full extent in a single period, every continuation contract of an optimal
contract is itself optimal; the marginal utility ratio between one agent and
another is a submartingale. The results imply that it is in general important
to restrict an agent whose moral hazard constraint is binding from saving
through another agent within the risk-sharing group. Limited commitment
and long-run implications of optimal contracting are also examined.
Keywords: Risk sharing, Two-sided moral hazard, Hidden eﬀort, Dynamic
contracts, Consumption distribution.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C7, D3, D8, J0
21 Introduction
This paper is a study of the dynamics of eﬃcient consumption distribution in
a production economy with hidden eﬀorts. The economy I consider is populated
with individuals who engage in risky production of a non-storable good using their
eﬀorts as the only inputs. The agents, having no access to outside insurance, must
share the risks in their individual outputs. Optimal risk-sharing requires an agent
who has high output today to transfer some of the output to an agent with low
output in return for more consumption in the future; an agent having low output
should do the opposite. The diﬃculty with this intertemporal transfer scheme is
that it can adversely aﬀect agents’ incentives to work because eﬀorts are private
information. For this reason, optimal allocation must balance the needs of both
risk-sharing and incentive provision. The purpose of this study is to investigate
how this tradeoﬀ aﬀects the distribution of consumption across the individuals in
the economy when all of them may face incentive constraints.
The model I study in this paper relaxes two important assumptions that un-
derlie most of the existing work on dynamic insurance with private information
(exceptions will be discussed later in this section). These are one-sided incen-
tive constraints and exogenous risks. The former assumption is maintained in
dynamic principal-agent models with hidden action (Rogerson [38], Spear and Sri-
vastava [39], Atkeson [3], and Phelan and Townsend [32]), and both assumptions
are stipulated in studies of dynamic insurance with private exogenous risks, such
as endowment shocks (Townsend [44], Green [18], Thomas and Worrall [41], and
Phelan [35]), preference shocks (Atkeson and Lucas [4]), or unemployment risks
(e.g. Atkeson and Lucas [5]). These assumptions, although capturing some im-
portant aspects of private information, are at odds with many risk-sharing groups,
such as worker-consumers in a closed economy or countries in a monetary union,
where agents’ eﬀorts are productive and responsive to risk-sharing arrangements,
and all agents may face moral hazard problems. This paper takes one step toward
ﬁlling this gap.
Speciﬁcally, the model considered in this paper builds on Rogerson [37] and
Spear and Srivastava [39] but extends their principal-agent model to allow for two-
sided hidden eﬀort; period-by-period aggregate resource constraints as in Atkeson
and Lucas [4] and Wang [46] are also imposed to ensure a closed economy. This
setup is particularly suitable for the study of consumption distribution when risk-
sharing and the incentive to work are the primary concerns.
To characterize optimal allocation in this model, I formulate the problem as a
recursive optimization problem using expected lifetime utility of one agent as the
state variable. When agents can be punished to the full extent in a single period,
optimal allocations are necessarily recursively optimal, i.e. the continuations of
3the long-term contract remain optimal from every period onwards. This property
enables me to derive simple laws of motion (Euler equations) that govern the
optimal evolution of consumption distribution and eﬀort choices.
These laws of motion imply that the stochastic processes of agents’ marginal
utility ratios are submartingales, namely they increase over time in conditional
expectation. To put this result into perspective, recall that the seminal work of
Rogerson [37] showed that in the repeated principal-agent model the ratio of the
principal’s marginal utility to that of the agent is a martingale. My result therefore
generalizes Rogerson’s ﬁnding to multi-sided moral hazard with any ﬁnite number
of agents: if an agent faces a moral hazard constraint then the ratio of this agent’s
marginal utility to that of another agent is a submartingale; if the agent is not
constrained by moral hazard then the ratio is a martingale.
This characterization sheds light on an important aspect of optimal resource
allocation with private information. As we know the fundamental diﬃculty caused
by incentive constraints is that optimal allocations are generally incompatible with
unregulated trade between agents; ex post, certain markets need be closed to keep
agents at the ex ante optimum (Mirrlees [30]). The question is what types of trades
and markets should be prohibited for an optimal allocation to be implementable
in a market equilibrium or in some other system of resource allocations.
The answer to this question is provided by the submartingale characterization:
at an output history where an agent i’s incentive constraint is binding, if i is given
the chance to borrow or save through another agent j on lending terms that make
j just indiﬀerent, then holding eﬀorts unchanged agent i prefers to save rather
than borrow. To understand better this result, it is useful to contrast it with the
previous ﬁnding, by Diamond and Mirrlees [11] and Rogerson [37], in repeated
one-sided moral hazard with a risk-neutral principal. These authors showed that
if the agent is the only one facing an incentive constraint and the principal has
the resources to insure the agent, then the agent should be prohibited from saving
in external credit markets in order for optimal allocations to be implementable.
This is not the case for the more general multi-sided moral hazard problem.
In particular, the result in this paper reveals an important distinction between
external and internal credit markets in repeated multi-sided moral hazard. In
the external market, not only do optimal allocations exhibit savings constraints
but they also exhibit borrowing constraints. This is due to the aggregate resource
constraints and risk aversion of all agents. In contrast, in the internal markets
there generally exist restrictions on saving, i.e. the optimal contracts prevent an
agent facing a moral hazard constraint from saving through other agents. This
distinction between external and internal markets is not essential in the principal-
agent model because both markets oﬀer the agent the same lending terms.
The submartingale characterization also has strong normative implications for
4long-run distribution: inequality of consumption among agents will keep growing
over time. This is in keeping with the ﬁndings in one-sided moral hazard (e.g.
Green [18], Thomas and Worrall [41], and Atkeson and Lucas [4]). More precisely
though, I show that in an optimal allocation along almost all sample paths the
consumption distribution either converges to some perfect risk-sharing outcome
(i.e. marginal utility ratio is constant across states) or drifts toward extreme
inequalities with some agent consuming all the output. Moreover, if an agent’s
consumption diverges to its minimum level, his eﬀort may somewhat paradoxically
converge to the most productive incentive compatible level; conversely, the eﬀort
may converge to the minimum level if consumption approaches its maximum level.
The result therefore displays an extreme form of tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and
inequality, which seems to ﬁt a casual observation of income distributions in some
economies.
I also extend the above analysis to the situation where one or more of the
agents have only limited commitment to long-term contracting, which is modeled
by imposing a minimum level of acceptable lifetime utility, along the lines of
Atkeson [3], Atkeson and Lucas [5], and Phelan [34]. The main characterization
results continue to hold; in particular, optimal contracts are still recursive optimal,
and as long as his commitment constraint is not binding an agent still faces savings
constraints in the internal credit market. But when the commitment constraint
is binding, the agent may be restricted from borrowing from the other agents
because otherwise the optimal contract may have to promise him a utility below
the minimum acceptable level.
The characterizations of optimal consumption allocation derived in this paper
can potentially be tested empirically. For instance, the laws of motion derived
in Section 4 generate testable hypotheses against the alternative assumption of
one-sided moral hazard, thus providing a method, along the lines of Townsend
[45] and Ligon [27], for detecting binding individual moral hazard constraints in
a given risk sharing pool.
A methodological contribution of this paper is the development of a simple
recursive formulation of the dynamic contracting problem with two-sided moral
hazard. This is possible when at least one of the agents has an unbounded utility
function therefore can be punished arbitrarily in every period. The idea is that
such an agent can serve as a risk averse principal, possibly facing moral hazard,
and the state of the system can be characterized using the other agent’s lifetime
utility alone. The optimal lifetime utility of the “principal” as a function of that
of the agent satisﬁes a Bellman equation. Compared with one-sided moral hazard,
an important feature of this functional equation is that the value function itself
also appears in the constraints. Previous studies, such as Thomas and Worrall [42]
and Wang [46], showed that the mapping that deﬁnes such a functional equation
5usually fails to be a contraction. By contrast, here the mapping is a contraction
in the appropriate function space. This result provides a simpler algorithm for
computing optimal allocations than working directly with the utility possibility
set as in the standard recursive approach (Abreu et al. [1]).
Two other studies on dynamic contracting are closely related to this paper.
Wang [46] studied dynamic risk-sharing between two agents who endure periodic
hidden endowment shocks. It is the ﬁrst study of dynamic insurance with two-
sided hidden information. Although models of hidden information are sometimes
“isomorphic” to models of hidden action, it is not the case for a small number of
agents with an inﬁnite time horizon. With hidden information a general mech-
anism would ask agents to report their types without necessarily revealing their
reports to each other. This requires an analysis of inﬁnitely repeated games with
private monitoring, a task still facing some unresolved diﬃculties.1 To get around
of this problem, Wang considers a class of mechanisms in which agents’ reports
are always made public. He then formulates the contracting problem as a recur-
sive optimization problem using one agent’s lifetime utility as a state variable.
Unfortunately, the characterization of the optimal value function as a ﬁxed point
of a Bellman equation faces some diﬃculties. The problem can be attributed to
the assumptions in [46] that budgets must be balanced and utility functions are
bounded; the latter assumption is implicit, as pointed out by Phelan [35].
The other related paper is Friedman [13]. As in this paper, it studies a model
of dynamic risk-sharing with hidden action. However, the methods and focuses
of the two studies are quite diﬀerent. Friedman treats the problem as a planner
maximizing a weighted social welfare function. In order to solve for the optimal
contracts, he formulates the problem recursively using the utility weights of all
agents as state variables. By contrast, I develop a simpler recursive formulation
using the lifetime utility of one of the two agents as the state variable. Another
important modeling diﬀerence is that Friedman’s analysis relies on the ﬁrst-order
approach (e.g. Rogerson [38]) and is conﬁned to a limited class of output distri-
butions. By contrast, except for the independence and full support assumptions
the analysis in this paper puts no further restriction on the output distributions;
in particular it encompasses the popular case with ﬁnite actions. Moreover, while
Friedman focuses on growing inequality in consumption over time, my analysis
reveals the important implications of optimal risk-sharing on credit restrictions
within and outside the group.
Finally, the stage model of this paper is obviously related to the existing studies
of double moral hazard and moral hazard in teams. Aside from the fact that most
1See the Journal of Economic Theory (January 2002) symposium on repeated games with
private monitoring for some recent progress.
6of these studies deal with static contracting, another diﬀerence is that they mainly
focus on the free rider problem due to joint production: when only total output
is observed and agents share the output, it creates incentives for agents to shirk.2
Note that this incentive problem will occur even if agents are risk neutral. In
contrast, here I focus on the conﬂict between risk-sharing and the incentive to
work, which arises even if agents’ outputs are independent of each other.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic
model and presents some preliminary analyses. Section 3 presents the recursive
structure of optimal contracts. Section 4 characterizes optimal intertemporal al-
locations. Section 5 studies long-run behavior and presents a computed example.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Statement of the Problem and Preliminary Analyses
In this section I spell out the details of the model economy, deﬁne optimal alloca-
tions, and state results related to the existence of optimal allocations.
Consider an economy with two long-lived agents, i = 1,2. The analysis gen-
eralizes naturally to any ﬁnite number of agents. Time is discrete: t = 1,2,...
The physical environment remains unchanged at each date. Speciﬁcally, in every
period agent i can produce a perishable consumption good using action (or eﬀort)
as the only input. The feasible actions of agent i are contained in some nonempty
compact set Ai ⊆ <. Agent i’s output θi is jointly determined by his action and
some random shock. I assume that outputs θi take values in a ﬁnite set Θi ⊆ <++.
Given action ai ∈ Ai, output θi ∈ Θi will be realized with probability pi(θi|ai).
For simplicity, I make the following assumption regarding distributions pi.
A1. For i = 1,2 probability function pi : Ai × Θi → [0, 1] is continuous and
pi(θi|ai) > 0 for all ai ∈ Ai and all θi ∈ Θi.
The timing and information structure are as follows. In each period, ﬁrst
the agents simultaneously choose their actions, which are private information;
next, outputs are realized and become public information; then according to pre-
speciﬁed rules outputs may be transferred between the agents; ﬁnally consumption
takes place at the end of the period (recall that the good is non-storable).
In this economy an allocation should specify agents’ consumption and eﬀort
choices at each date based upon publicly available information. Speciﬁcally, the
2See Legros and Matsushima [25], Legros and Matthews [26], Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine
[6], Al-Najjar [2], Gupta and Romano [20], and Kim and Wang [22] for double moral hazard,
where both contracting parties can take hidden actions. See Holmstrom [21], Mookherjee [31],
Lazear and Rosen [24], Demski and Sappington [10], and Ma [29] for moral hazard in teams,
where a principal writes contract with a group of agents.
7public information up to the end of date t is summarized in the (public) history
ht = (θ1,...,θt), where θτ ≡ (θτ
1,θτ
2) denotes date-τ output realizations of the two
agents. It is convenient to let h0 be the null history at the beginning of date 1.




i(ht) for every end-of-period-t history ht.3 Similarly an action plan
si is a sequence of maps {st
i}∞
t=1 that speciﬁes eﬀort choice st
i(ht−1) for every
beginning-of-period-t history ht−1.
Then an allocation or a contract σ = (ci,si) is a pair of consumption plans
and a pair of action plans.







where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability distribution, induced
by the action plans (si), over all histories ht.
Note that agents’ utility functions in each period are additively separable in
consumption and eﬀort. This separability together with the following assumption
will greatly simplify the analysis of this model.
A2. For i = 1,2, the eﬀort cost function gi : Ai → <+ is continuous and
minai g(ai) = 0; the real-valued consumption utility function ui(·) is deﬁned on
an interval (ci,∞) with ci = 0 or −∞, u0
i(·) > 0, u00
i (·) ≤ 0 (< 0 for some i), and
limc→ci ui(c) = −∞.4
For the most part of the paper I assume that the lower bound ci = 0.5 The as-
sumption ui(ci) = −∞ means that the agents can be punished arbitrarily severely
in a single period.
The following alternative assumption will also be considered.
A2’. The same as assumption A2 except that agent 1’s consumption utility
function u1 is deﬁned on the interval [c1 = 0, ∞) hence u1(c1) > −∞.
Since actions are not observable, incentive compatibility must be imposed.
Speciﬁcally, contract σ = (ci,si) is incentive compatible if for i = 1,2, given the
plans (c1,c2) and s−i,
Ui(c1,c2,si,s−i) ≥ Ui(c1,c2, ˜ si,s−i)
3For subsequent analysis it is often convenient to also consider the equivalent utility plan (zi)
that assigns utility zi(h
t) = ui(ci(h
t)) to agent i at history h
t.
4The class of utility functions satisfying (A2) include the CRRA utility functions: u(c) =
c
1−γ/(1−γ) for γ ≥ 1, in which case the consumption lower bound c = 0, and the CARA utility
functions: u(c) = −e
−γc for γ > 0, in which case c = −∞.
5However, see Section 6 Proposition 8 for a case where ci = −∞.
8for every action plan ˜ si of agent i. In other words, given the consumption plans
(ci) agents’ action plans (si) constitute a Nash equilibrium for the induced inﬁnite-
horizon dynamic game. It is well known that when output distributions have full
support, which is assumed in A1, contract σ is incentive compatible if and only
if it satisﬁes the following one-step incentive constraints for i,j = 1,2, i 6= j at
every history ht:




p(θi|ai)p(θj|sj(ht))[ui(ci(ht,θ)) + δU(σ|ht,θ)] − gi(ai).
Here σ|ht is the continuation contract of σ given history ht.





2, ∀ht 6= h0 (1)
and the limited commitment constraints
Ui(σ|ht) > Ui, ∀ht, ∀i. (2)
The resource constraints ensure that the economy is closed. The limited com-
mitment constraints have the following interpretation: at the beginning of period
t each agent i may choose to walk away from the ongoing contract and take some
outside option thereafter. For instance, the agents may declare bankruptcy and
go into autarky forever. I assume that agent i can obtain some expected lifetime
utility no more than a ﬁxed level Ui from the outside options, and if the agent
does not walk away at the beginning of a given date then he would have to honor
the current contract for that period.6 I allow the possibility that Ui = −∞, in
which case agent i does not face limited commitment constraints.
A feasible and incentive compatible contract is said to be incentive feasible.
To make the problem nontrivial, I assume that each Ui is not too large so that
there exist incentive feasible contracts; a suﬃcient condition for this is that Ui is
no larger than the optimal autarkic payoﬀ of agent i.
The aim of this paper is to study allocations that are Pareto optimal amongst
all incentive feasible allocations.
Deﬁnition 1. A contract σ is constrained Pareto optimal (henceforth optimal) if
σ is incentive feasible and there does not exist another incentive feasible contract
σ0 such that Ui(σ0) > Ui(σ) and U−i(σ0) > U−i(σ), for some i = 1,2.
Every incentive feasible contract σ delivers a vector of lifetime utilities (Ui(σ))
to the agents. Such utility vectors constitute the utility possibility set. Its Pareto
frontier comprises the utility vectors attainable by the optimal contracts.
6This is a formulation also adopted by Atkeson and Lucas [5] and Phelan [34].
9In the remainder of this section, I will establish the existence of optimal con-
tracts. For this and characterization purposes, it is useful to consider the utility
frontier of agent 2.
Let D be the set of lifetime utilities of agent 1 that are attainable by incentive
feasible contracts. For all ξ ∈ D, deﬁne Σ(ξ) as the set of incentive feasible




be the set of
agent 2’s lifetime utilities attainable by the contracts in Σ(ξ). This deﬁnes a
correspondence V : D ￿ <, whose graph is the utility possibility set.
Lemma 1. If A1 and either A2 or A2’ are satisﬁed, then (a) the correspondence
V : D ￿ < has a closed graph, i.e. for every sequence (ξn, yn) → (ξ, y) ∈ <2
with ξn ∈ D and yn ∈ V(ξn) for all n, we have ξ ∈ D and y ∈ V(ξ); (b) for every
ξi ∈ < there exists Kj ∈ < such that if Ui(σ) > ξi then Uj(σ) 6 Kj.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Deﬁne V (ξ) = sup V(ξ), for all ξ ∈ D. Function V (·) corresponds to the utility
frontier of agent 2, which contains the Pareto frontier of the utility possibility set.
The following lemma shows that the sup in the deﬁnition of V is always at-
tained, i.e. for each promised utility ξ to agent one there is a contract that
maximizes agent two’s utility.
Lemma 2. If A1 and either A2 or A2’ are satisﬁed, then (a) for all ξ ∈ D, there
is an incentive feasible contract σ with U1(σ) = ξ and U2(σ) = V (ξ); (b) function
V (·) is upper semi-continuous.
Proof. Part (a) follows because by Lemma 1, for all ξ ∈ D set V(ξ) is closed and
bounded from above.
Let (ξn) → ξ ∈ D with ξn ∈ D and yn = V (ξn) for all n. By Lemma 1,
the sequence (yn) is bounded from above and limsup(yn) ∈ V(ξ). It follows that
V (ξ) ≥ limsup(yn); hence V is upper semi-continuous.
The utility frontier V (·) may not be strictly decreasing and therefore all points
in its graph may not be Pareto optimal. Nevertheless, since V (·) is upper semi-
continuous, optimal contracts always exist, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume A1 and either A2 or A2’. Given ξ1,ξ2 ∈ <, if there
is some x ∈ D and y ∈ V(x) with x > ξ1, y > ξ2, then there exists an optimal
contract σ with U1(σ) > ξ1 and U2(σ) > ξ2.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the intersection of graph of V and set {(x,y)|x ≥ ξ1, y ≥
ξ2} is closed and bounded hence compact. Its projection, D0 ≡ {x ∈ D|x ≥
ξ1,and∃y ∈ V(x)s.t. y ≥ ξ2} is also compact. Then the upper semi-continuous
10function V : D → < attains its maximum on set D0. Moreover, the compact set of
maximizers in D0 has a maximal element x∗. A contract σ with U1(σ) = x∗ and
U2(σ) = V (x∗) clearly is optimal, because if there is any σ0 with U1(σ0) = ξ > x∗
and U2(σ0) = V (x∗) ≥ ξ2 it contradicts the deﬁnition of x∗.
If both agents’ consumption utility functions ui are unbounded from below
then V (·) is strictly decreasing and indeed deﬁnes the Pareto frontier.
Lemma 3. If A1 and A2 are satisﬁed, then (a) function V (·) is strictly decreasing
and continuous; and (b) contract σ is Pareto optimal if and only if U2(σ) = V (ξ)
with ξ ≡ U1(σ).
Proof. We only need prove part (a), since for (b), the “only if” part is obvious
and the “if” part would follow if V (·) is strictly decreasing.
We ﬁrst prove monotonicity. Let σ be an incentive feasible contract with
U1(σ) = ξ ∈ D and U2(σ) = V (ξ); let ξ0 ∈ D with ξ0 < ξ. If there is an incentive
feasible contract σ0 with U1(σ0) = ξ0 and U2(σ0) > V (ξ), then V (ξ0) > V (ξ).
The contract σ0 can be constructed from the initial contract σ by “reshuﬄing”
agents’ consumptions at date 1 without aﬀecting agents’ incentives to take the
given actions.
Speciﬁcally, we reduce agent 1’s expected utility conditional on each of his
output realization θ1, i.e.
P
θ2 p(θ2|a2)u1(c1(θ1,θ2)), by the same amount ξ −ξ0 >
0. To keep incentives of agent 2 intact, consumption should be transferred from
agent 1 to agent 2 in a way so that for each θ1 agent 2’s utilities u2(c2(θ1,θ2)) are
increased by some equal amount, y(θ1) > 0, across all θ2.
In other words, we need only ﬁnd y(θ1) for all θ1 such that agent 1’s new
consumptions










p(θ2)u1(e c1(θ)) = ξ − ξ0, ∀θ1. (3)
Note that the left-hand side of (3) is continuous and strictly increasing in y(θ1),
is equal to 0 if y(θ1) = 0, and goes to ∞ if y(θ1) becomes large. Therefore there
exists some y(θ1) satisfying the equation for all θ1.
By construction, each agent’s expected utility is changed by an equal amount
conditional on his own output realizations. Therefore the new contract is incentive
compatible given that the initial contract is. Moreover, U1(σ0) = ξ0 and V (ξ0) ≥
U2(σ0) > V (ξ). Thus V (·) is strictly decreasing.
11Since V (·) is upper semi-continuous by Lemma 2, it only remains to prove that
it is also lower semi-continuous. Consider some ξ0 > ξ. We can construct contract
σ0 in the same way as in the above by ﬁnding y(θ1) < 0, ∀θ1, that satisfy equation
(3). By construction, V (ξ0) ≥ U2(σ0) = V (ξ)−ε with ε = −
P
θ1 p(θ1|a1)y(θ1) > 0.
By (3), ξ0 ↓ ξ implies y(θ1) ↑ 0 and hence ε ↓ 0. Since V (ξ0) > V (ξ) for ξ0 < ξ,
this implies that V (ξ) ≤ liminfξ0→ξ V (ξ0). Hence V is lower semi-continuous and
the proof is complete.
3 A Recursive Formulation
In this section I show that the utility frontier V (·) satisﬁes a recursive functional
equation. An algorithm then is developed to solve this functional equation. When
both agents have unbounded utility functions, this recursive structure is strength-
ened to recursive optimality, which permits simple characterizations of the optimal
contracts in the next section.
3.1 A Bellman Equation
I begin the analysis with a complete characterization of the domain of function V
when neither agent faces a limited commitment constraint. Recall that this is the
set of agent one’s lifetime utilities attainable in incentive feasible contracts.
First, deﬁne a real number Q as follows. If the lower bound on agent 2’s
consumption c2 = −∞, then let Q = u1(∞)/(1 − δ). It is possible that Q = ∞.
If the lower bound c2 = 0 then deﬁne Q by the following program. If a2 is
implementable, i.e. if ∃ c(θ2) > 0, ∀θ2 ∈ Θ2, such that













u1 (λ(θ1 + θ2))p1(θ1|a1)p2(θ2|a2) − g1(a1) (4)
where the parameter λ ∈ (c1, 1] if assumption A2 holds and λ ∈ [0, 1] if A2’





Program Q(λ, a2) has the following interpretation: at each date if agent 1
consumes a fraction λ of the total output and agent 2 is made to take action a2 then
agent 1’s optimal payoﬀ equals (1−δ)Q(λ, a2). Since every implementable action
12a2 can be implemented with arbitrarily low resource costs, the payoﬀ Q(λ, a2)
can always be attained for all λ ∈ (c1, 1). Therefore Q is the supremum of the
incentive feasible lifetime utilities of agent one.
Note that an optimal solution to Problem (4) exists because set A1 is compact
and the objective function is continuous in a1; the maximum in (5) is also well-
deﬁned because by the Theorem of the Maximum, function Q(1,a2) is continuous
in a2 and the set of implementable a2’s is compact.
Let D∞ be the set of incentive feasible lifetime utilities of agent one when
default payoﬀs Ui = −∞, ∀i. The following lemma shows that D∞ is an interval
with Q as the least upper bound.
Lemma 4. Set D∞ = (−∞, Q) if Assumptions A1 and A2 are satisﬁed, and
D∞ = [0, Q) if A1 and A2’ are satisﬁed.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Next I develop the recursive characterization of the utility frontier V . To this
end, I deﬁne an operator T on the space of real-valued functions with domains
S ⊆ D∞ in the following functional equation.










subject to (7) to (10):
X
θ

























∀θ : c1(θ) + c2(θ) 6 θ1 + θ2, U(θ) ∈ S
ci(θ) > ci (“ > ”for i = 1 if A2’ holds). (10)
Note that Eq. (7) is the promise-keeping constraint for agent 1; (8) and (9)
are the incentive constraints for agents 1 and 2 respectively; (10) is the feasibility
constraints.
Functional equation (FE) and operator T have the following straightforward
interpretation: if agent 1 must be promised continuation utilities U(θ) in set S
13and agent 2 must stay on the continuation utility frontier f in the next period,
then the current utility frontier of agent 2 is given by T(f). For this reason, Tf
is said to be generated by f.
The next two lemmas establish the link between the optimal value function V
and functional equation (FE). Lemma 5 shows that it is suﬃcient to stay on the
utility frontier V (·) to generate points on this frontier; Lemma 6 shows that V is
a ﬁxed point of T.
Lemma 5. If A1 and either A2 or A2’ are satisﬁed and σ is an optimal contract
with U2(σ) = V (U1(σ)), then there exists another incentive feasible contract σ0
with Ui(σ0) = Ui(σ) for i = 1,2, and U2(σ0|θ) = V (U1(σ0|θ)) for all θ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 6. If A1 and either A2 or A2’ are satisﬁed then the optimal value function
V : D → < is a ﬁxed point of operator T: T(V ) = V , and the sup in Program
(FE) is attained at this ﬁxed point.
Proof. See the Appendix.
These two lemmas imply that one can characterize the optimal value function
V by solving the Bellman equation (FE). One feature of functional equation (FE)
is that the continuation value function f appears in the constraints. This is also
true in the models of Thomas and Worrall (1994) and Wang (1995). As shown by
these authors, the mapping that deﬁnes such a functional equation may fail to be
a contraction, which can make it diﬃcult to compute the optimal value function.
What is new in this model is that the mapping T deﬁned in (FE) is a contrac-
tion when the agents have limited commitments.
Speciﬁcally, let S be a compact subset of D∞ and let B(S) be the set of bounded
real-valued functions deﬁned on set S. Note that endowed with the sup metric
B(S) is a complete metric space.
The following proposition provides the basic characterization of the operator
T on the space B(S) and also oﬀers a powerful algorithm for ﬁnding function V
when its domain D = S is known.
Proposition 2. Suppose that A1 and either A2 or A2’ are satisﬁed. Then the
operator T deﬁned in (FE) is a contraction mapping on B(S).
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is useful to know when the optimization problem in (FE) has a solution. Let
Bu(S) be the set of bounded real-valued upper semi-continuous functions deﬁned
14on S. Note that Bu(S) is a closed subset of B(S).7 Lemma 7 below, which
parallels Lemma 2, shows that the sup in (FE) is attained for f ∈ Bu(S) and
T(Bu(S)) ⊆ Bu(S); hence the ﬁxed point of T is upper semi-continuous.
Lemma 7. Suppose that A1 and either A2 or A2’ are satisﬁed. If f ∈ Bu(S)
then (a) for all ξ ∈ S, there is a policy vector (ai,ci(·),U(·)) that satisﬁes the
constraints of (FE) and attains Tf(ξ); (b) function Tf ∈ Bu(S).
Proof. See the Appendix.
In Proposition 2 and Lemma 7, agent one’s expected utility is assumed to be
within some compact set S. This is consistent with both agents having limited
commitment constraints, i.e. Ui > −∞ ∀i, because in this case the domain of
function V is indeed a compact set D ⊂ D∞. If set D is known in advance
then one can easily compute the optimal value function V using the contraction
mapping algorithm.
However, when only the default payoﬀs Ui are given, the domain D is typically
not known a priori and hence must be solved as part of the characterization of V .
The following proposition provides a method, based on the above contraction
mapping algorithm, for computing V and its domain D at the same time.
Let S0 be a compact subset of D∞ that contains D. Let f0 be the unique ﬁxed
point of the operator T deﬁned in (FE) on the space B(S0). For k = 1,2,..., let
Sk = {ξ ∈ Sk−1 | ξ > U1 and fk−1(ξ) > U2 }
and fk : Sk → < be given by fk = T(fk
k−1), where fk
k−1 is the restriction of fk−1
to set Sk.
Proposition 3. Suppose that A1 and either A2 or A2’ are satisﬁed. Then (Sk)
is a nested decreasing sequence of compact sets that converges to D, and for all
ξ ∈ D the sequence (fk(ξ)) is monotone decreasing and converges to V (ξ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 is analogous to the recursive algorithm proposed by Abreu et al.
[1]. The diﬀerence is that instead of doing iteration on the utility possibility sets
we work directly with the utility frontiers of the utility sets.
A computed example using the contraction mapping algorithm is presented in
Section 5.
7Let (fk) be a convergent sequence in B
u(S) with limit f ∈ B(S). Let (ξn) → ξ ∈ S with





2 < fk(ξ) +
3ε
4 < f(ξ) + ε.
15In addition to providing a computational tool, functional equation (FE) also
transforms the dynamic contracting problem into a static one, a study of which
can reveal more characteristics of the optimal contracts. At this level of generality,
however, the optimal value function V may not be diﬀerentiable everywhere and
may contain non-concave portions, which make the problem in (FE) diﬃcult to
analyze using the standard methods. Of course one can allow public randomiza-
tion in contracting so as to convexify the utility possibility set; then the value
function V will be concave and (FE) will be a relatively simple concave program-
ming problem. (See Phelan and Townsend [32] for an analysis of the repeated
principal-agent problem with random contracts and Zhao [48] for a study of the
renegotiation-proof contracts with randomization.)
But it turns out that the main results of this paper can be derived without
introducing random contracts as long as Assumption A2 is satisﬁed. Therefore,
to simplify the analysis I assume that A2 is satisﬁed in the rest of the paper. This
will allow a much cleaner characterization of the optimal contracts.
3.2 Recursive Optimality
First, the recursive structure can be strengthened when both agents’ utility func-
tions are unbounded from below, as shown in the following proposition. This
result provides the basis for further characterizations in the next section.
Proposition 4. If A1 and A2 are satisﬁed, and contract σ is optimal then:
(a) every continuation contract σ|ht is optimal;




(c) there does not exist a history ht 6= h0 where one can ﬁnd some consumption as-
signments ˆ ci(ht) and an incentive feasible contract ˆ σ such that ui(ˆ ci(ht))+δUi(ˆ σ) ≥
ui(ci(ht)) + δUi(σ|ht) for i = 1,2 with strict inequality for some i.
Proof. We only need prove part (c), as it implies (a) and (b).
Suppose that contrary to the claim in (c), at some history h1 = θ0 = (θ0
1,θ0
2)
there exist some consumption assignments ˆ ci(θ0) and an incentive feasible contract
ˆ σ such that u1(ˆ c1(θ0)) + δU1(ˆ σ) = u1(c1(θ0)) + δU1(σ|θ0) and d ≡ u2(ˆ c2(θ0)) +
δU2(ˆ σ)−(u2(c2(θ0))+δU2(σ|θ0)) > 0; if agent 1 is strictly better oﬀ then one can
reduce ˆ c1(θ0) and increase ˆ c2(θ0) to make these conditions satisﬁed. I shall show
that σ fails to be optimal by ﬁnding a Pareto superior contract ˜ σ.
Contract ˜ σ is constructed based on σ and ˆ σ as follows. First replace contin-
uation contract σ|θ0 with ˆ σ. Since agent 2’s expected utility conditional on θ0 is
increased by d > 0, his incentive constraints at date 1 may be aﬀected.
To restore agent 2’s incentives, I shall “reshuﬄe” agents’ consumptions at
date 1. For this purpose, it is convenient to consider the utility assignments
16zi(θ) = ui(ci(θ)) to the agents. I transfer consumptions from agent 2 to agent 1
at states (θ1,θ0
2), ∀θ1, in such a way that agent 1’s utility z1(θ1,θ0
2) is increased
by an equal amount y for all θ1 and agent 2’s expected utility conditional on θ0
2 is
reduced by the amount p1(θ0
1)d.
Namely, for θ0
2 and for all θ1, the new utility assignments of agent one at date



































2) are the total consumptions in σ.
Note that the left-hand-side of (11) is a continuous, strictly decreasing function
L(y) with L(0) > right-hand-side and L(y) −→ −∞ as y increases. Therefore there
exists a desired y > 0 that satisﬁes (11).
Compared with initial contract σ, each agent’s expected utility conditional on
his own output either remains unchanged or is increased by the same amount across
his output realizations. Therefore the new contract ˜ σ is incentive compatible.
Since the reshuﬄes of consumptions always kept both agents’ continuation utilities
at least as large as in σ, the ﬁnal contract ˜ σ also satisﬁes the limited commitment
constraints and hence is feasible. Moreover, we have U1(˜ σ) > U1(σ), U2(˜ σ) =
U2(σ). Thus σ is not optimal, which is a contradiction.
If part (c) does not hold for some history ht with t > 1, then applying the
above arguments recursively one can prove that σ|ht−1,...,σ|h1, and σ are not
optimal.
Remark 1. Proposition 4 implies that when A1 and A2 are satisﬁed the results
of this paper continue to hold if the resource constraints in (1) are equalities, i.e
if the budget has to be balanced at all times. Such a situation arise naturally if
the agents can not commit to burning outputs (c.f. Wang [46]).
Proposition 4 strengthens Lemma 5 in two ways. First, while Lemma 5 states
that it is suﬃcient to stay on the utility frontier of agent 2 to generate points
on the frontier, Proposition 4 goes further to show that optimal contracts are
17necessarily recursively optimal. As we will see in the next section this makes a
big diﬀerence for the characterization of optimal contracts. Second, Proposition 4
shows that output burning is never needed in optimal contracts.
The intuition of Proposition 4, which is central to optimal risk-sharing in this
model, can be summarized as follows. Suppose some continuation contract σ|ht
is not optimal. To improve the situation, the obvious ﬁrst step is to replace σ|ht
with some Pareto superior contract. This of course may aﬀect agents’ incentives
at date t or earlier. To restore the incentives at date t, we redistribute agents’
consumptions in such a way that compared with σ one agent’s expected utilities
conditional on his own output signals remain unchanged and the other’s utilities
conditional on his own signals are increased by an equal amount across all signal
values. The result is a superior incentive feasible continuation contract at ht−1.
Applying this procedure recursively towards period 1 and reshuﬄing consump-
tions alternately from one agent to the other will lead to a contract that Pareto
dominates σ.
The above argument relies on several conditions: output signals are indepen-
dent, preferences are separable, and consumption utility functions are unbounded
from below. The separability conditions imply that each agent’s incentive to work
is determined by his expected payoﬀs conditional on his own output signals. Un-
bounded utility functions together with separable preferences take away the need
for punishing the agents through ex post suboptimal continuation contracts.8
Recursive optimality also implies that optimal contracts are renegotiation-
proof in a strong sense: if the agents are permitted to renegotiate the ongoing
contract at the beginning of some date, they would be unable to ﬁnd an incentive
feasible contract that can result in Pareto improvement even if they can commit
not to renegotiate any further in the future.9 Since any future renegotiation will
in general restrict the set of permissible contracts, recursive optimality therefore
is the strongest renegotiation-proof concept that sticks to the Pareto principle, i.e.
all agents have veto power.10
The recursive optimality of long-term optimal contracts when utility functions
8This assumption underlies the analyses in Grossman and Hart [19] and Rogerson [37]. Phe-
lan and Townsend [32] assumes bounded utility function, which explains the use of suboptimal
continuation contracts in optimal contracting there.
9 Here renegotiation is assumed to occur only at the beginning of a period before any action
is taken, which is consistent with the treatment in the repeated game literature. If renegotiation
could occur after action is taken but before output signals are realized (c.f. [17]) then optimal
contracts may not be renegotiation-proof. The underlying assumption here is that there is not
enough time after actions are taken but before outputs are realized for renegotiation to take
place.
10For instance here optimal contracts are strongly renegotiation-proof in the sense of Farrell
and Maskin [12].
18are unbounded is pointed out in Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom [15] in
the dynamic principal-agent model. Wang [47] studies renegotiation-proof con-
tracts in the ﬁnitely repeated principal-agent model when the agent’s utility func-
tion is bounded. Zhao [48] generalizes Wang’s analysis to the inﬁnitely repeated
principal-agent model. Clementi and Hopenhayn [8] study renegotiation-proof
debt contracts in a model of ﬁrm dynamics with ﬁnancing constraints.
In the remainder of this section I will use functional equation (FE) to de-
rive some properties of the contemporaneous pay-performance relation in optimal
contracting. The question about optimal risk-sharing is to what extent will one
agent’s output aﬀect the other’s consumption. Lemma 8 below shows that the
relationship between an agent’s consumption and his own performance is to some
extent immune to the other agent’s performance.
Lemma 8. Assume A1-A2. Fix an optimal contract and ﬁx a period t. Let
u0
i(θ1,θ2) be the marginal utility of agent i when date-t outputs are (θ1,θ2). Then






















i,θj) for all θj.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result says that as one runs through agent i’s output signals the sign of
the change in the marginal utility ratio is independent of (or perfectly positively
correlated across) the output realizations of agent j. In other words, to the extent
that the marginal utility ratio reﬂects agent i’s relative share of the total output,
its variation, at least qualitatively, is primarily determined by the agent’s own
performance. It is in this sense that an agent’s pay-performance relation is largely
isolated from the other agent’s performance. This of course is a reﬂection of
imperfect risk-sharing, which is needed for motivating eﬀort.
Next consider the optimization problem in (FE) when value function V replaces
f. Note that by Proposition 4 agent 2’s consumption is given by c2(θ) = θ1 +




be an optimal solution to program (FE). It then follows that given the vector
(a∗
1,a∗
2,U∗(·)), consumption choices c∗
1(·) maximize the objective function subject
to the constraints. If action sets A1, A2 are both ﬁnite, these constraints will
involve only ﬁnitely many inequalities. Then the problem can be analyzed using
the standard Kuhn-Tucker conditions. With the help of the following additional
assumption, a positive pay-performance relation will emerge.
A3. (Monotone likelihood ratio property) For i = 1,2 and for ai,a0
i ∈ Ai, gi(ai) >
gi(a0
i) implies that pi(θi|a0
i)/pi(θi|ai) weakly decreases in θi.
19Lemma 9. Assume A1-A3 and that sets A1 and A2 are ﬁnite. If the binding
incentive constraints for agent i involve only eﬀorts ai with gi(ai) < gi(a∗
i) then
agent i’s consumption c∗
i(θi,θj) is nondecreasing in his output θi for all θj.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 The Dynamics of Optimal Allocations
This section presents the main characterizations of the optimal allocations. I will
focus on the dynamics of optimal consumption allocations and will show in the
next section that the results also generalize to expected utilities and eﬀort choices.
4.1 The Main Characterizations
The characterization of optimal consumption allocations hinges on the behavior




2). In this model the ﬁrst-best optimal
risk-sharing would require the marginal utility ratio be constant both across con-
temporaneous output realizations and over time.
In constrained optimal contracts some variation in the marginal utility ratio is
needed for motivating eﬀorts. Nevertheless, optimal contracts attempt to smooth
the variations in the marginal utility ratio both across states and over time by uti-
lizing the intertemporal substitutability between current and future consumptions.
This kind of consideration gives rise to close-form Euler-type conditions, given in
the following proposition, that link the current consumption allocation (ct
i,ct
j) with
the next-period output-contingent consumptions (ct+1
i (θi,θj),ct+1
j (θi,θj)).
Proposition 5. Assume A1-A2. If the limited commitment constraints are non-


















where Eθq is the expectation operator with respect to output signal θq, for q = i,j,
given the eﬀorts at date t + 1 .
Note that if the default payoﬀs Ui = −∞, ∀i, then the limited commitment
constraints never bind and the result always holds.
The logic of Proposition 5 is at the heart of optimal risk-sharing and can
be summarized as follows. Given any optimal contract, one can always think of
“nearby” consumption plans that perturb the original consumption allocations
but preserve the eﬀort incentives. Such perturbations must be weakly Pareto
inferior by recursive optimality. The equations given in Proposition 5 are necessary
conditions of this fact.
20Proof. I will prove the equation for i = 2, j = 1; the other case is symmetric.
Let σ be an optimal contract and let ht, t ≥ 1, be a period-t history. For each
agent i, denote the consumption assignments at ht by ct
i and the corresponding
utility assignments by zt
i; for each output realization (θ1,θ2) in period t + 1,
denote the consumption assignments by ci(θ1,θ2) and the corresponding utility
assignments by zi(θ1,θ2).
I shall construct a class of perturbed continuation contracts ˜ σ|ht by modifying
the original consumption distributions at ht and in period t + 1. These perturba-
tions are indexed by the real numbers (η, ε, ν(θ1)) as follows.
First, at history ht I increase agent 2’s utility by a small amount η and decrease












where xt is the total output at history ht. (By Proposition 4 agents always consume
the total output.)
Next, I decrease agent 2’s utility at date t+1 by η/δ so as to keep his expected
utility at ht unchanged. This, however, should be done without aﬀecting either
agent’s incentives at ht. To this end, for each of agent 1’s output realization θ1
and for all pairs (θ1,θ2), decrease agent 2’s utility by some amount ν(θ1), i.e.
˜ z2(θ1,θ2) = z2(θ1,θ2) − ν(θ1)
and transfer the corresponding consumption to agent 1, i.e.
˜ c1(θ) = x(θ) − u−1
2 (˜ z2(θ))
where x(θ) = θ1 + θ2 again is the total output.
Note that the change in agent 2’s utility only depends on agent 1’s output.
Moreover, the ν(θ1)’s are chosen to satisfy the following two conditions:







• agent 1’s expected utility in period t + 1 conditional on each θ1 is increased
















+ ε, ∀θ1 ∈ Θ1. (14)
21Note that the new consumption allocations are constructed respecting the
resource constraints; and the limited commitment constraints should remain un-
aﬀected for small perturbations. Also, both agents’ incentives at ht and at dates
beyond t should remain intact since agent 1’s expected utility in period t+1 condi-
tional on each of his own output signal θ1 is increased by the same amount ε, and
agent 2’s expected utility in period t + 1 is changed in a way that is independent
of his output θ2.
Moreover, compared with the original contract agent 2’s expected utility at
history ht is unchanged in the perturbed contracts. Therefore, by part (c) of
Proposition 4 agent 1 must be weakly worse oﬀ in the perturbations.






2 + η)] + δε (15)
s.t. (13) and (14).
In the Appendix Eq. (12) is shown to be a necessary condition of this fact.
Remark 2. If agent j’s moral hazard constraint is slack at history ht, then the
problem reduces to the principal-agent problem with agent j being the risk averse
principal. Then in the above variation argument we only need to perturb agent i’s
utility at ht by η and his utility in period t + 1 by η/δ for all output realizations;















This is the famous martingale result of Rogerson [37]. An intuitive way of
seeing this directly from (12) is to suppose that agent j has only one output signal
and hence does not have a moral hazard problem, then equation (12) clearly
reduces to the above martingale equation. Therefore Proposition 5 generalizes
Rogerson’s result to the two-sided moral hazard model.
Note that with two-sided moral hazard constructing incentive-preserving per-
turbations of the optimal contract is more delicate: the perturbations must respect
the incentive constraints of both agents. But that is not all: there is an even more
subtle point regarding whether or not the variation method is applicable when the
utility functions are bounded.
Obviously, variation works only if the consumption levels are in the interior. As
long as the utility functions are unbounded (even if consumptions are bounded),
this condition is automatically satisﬁed. However, if the utility functions are
bounded then the argument may not work even if consumptions are in the interior.
22In this case the validity of the variation method will depend upon whether moral
hazard is two-sided or one-sided, as I explain next.
The central idea of the variation method rests on the condition that a small
perturbation of the optimal contract is weakly inferior for one agent subject to
the other agent being indiﬀerent. In the principal-agent model, this is always true
even if the agent’s utility function is bounded from below: if a contract is optimal
for the principal given the promised utility to the agent then any continuation
contract is necessarily optimal for the principal given the promised continuation
utility to the agent; otherwise we can replace the suboptimal continuation contract
with a better one and obtain a better overall contract for the principal. Therefore,
the variation argument can go through as long as the current and the next-period
consumptions are all in the interior.
This logic, however, does not work when there is two-sided moral hazard, be-
cause replacing a continuation contract with a “better” one can aﬀect the princi-
pal’s incentives, which makes the perturbation invalid. Put it diﬀerently, according
to Lemma 5 if agent 1’s utility is bounded from below then it is only suﬃcient to
stay on the utility frontier of agent 2 (the “principal”) to generate the points on
that frontier. Therefore it is not necessarily true that a perturbed continuation
contract must be weakly inferior to the original one, i.e. Proposition 4 may not
hold.11 Then the variation method is not guaranteed to work even if the current
and the next-period consumptions are all in the interior. Nevertheless, the method
does apply and the results are the same if the agents’ consumptions have been in
the interior since period 1; in this case the reshuﬄing procedure can be applied
recursively from period t back towards period 1, just like in the case of unbounded
utility functions.
The next result, which follows from Proposition 5 directly, states that the
sequence of marginal utility ratios is a submartingale. This result will be essential
for studying the long-run behavior of optimal contracts.
Corollary 1. Assume A1-A2. Given an optimal contract, if at history ht 6= h0
















where the expectation is taken conditional on ht, and the inequality is strict if there




j ) is not constant across all θi.
Proof. See the Appendix.
11Of course if such a better continuation contract exists it has to destroy incentive constraints
in period t or earlier.
23The submartingale result rules out autarky as an optimal allocation.
Corollary 2. Assume A1-A2. A sequence of stationary one-period contracts can
not be optimal unless it is ﬁrst best, i.e. unless marginal utility ratio is constant.
In particular, autarky is not optimal.
Proof. The argument is straightforward. Suppose to the contrary an optimal
contract consists of a sequence of stationary one-period contracts. But if the
one-period contract is not ﬁrst best, i.e. u0
j/u0
i is not constant across all output
realizations, then it contradicts the submartingale condition: max{u0
j/u0
i} can not
be less than or equal to the expected value of u0
j/u0
i. Autarky is not optimal since
it is stationary and is not ﬁrst-best.
Remark 3. The above results can be generalized easily to more than two agents.


















where θ−j denotes a generic vector of output signals produced by all agents other






























The proofs for these results are virtually the same as in the two-agent case.
First, the recursive optimality as in Proposition 4 can be proved for the general
case: we can show in much the same way that holding constant other agents’
expected utilities it is not possible to improve agent i’s utility without hurting
agent j. Then in the variation argument we treat the pair of agents i and j
under consideration separately from the rest of the agents as if it is a two-agent
relationship; in particular, all other agents’ consumptions remain unchanged.
Note that conditions (12), (16), and (17)-(19) hold for every optimal contract
independent of the initial lifetime utilities of the agents. This is important for em-
pirically testing these restrictions since data on initial utilities in general are not
available. Speciﬁcally, the method developed by Ligon [27], who tested Rogerson’s
repeated principal-agent model using data from three villages in South India, can
be adapted to test the hypothesis of two-sided moral hazard against the assump-
tion of one-sided moral hazard, using the submartingale equation (18) vs. the
martingale equation (19).12
12Details for implementing the test are available upon request.
244.2 Credit Markets and Savings Constraints
It is well-known that in order to implement optimal allocations it is essential to
prevent the agents from participating in other credit markets. The interesting
question is what types of restrictions are really necessary.
Diamond and Mirrlees [11] and Rogerson [37] have shown that in the repeated
principal-agent model preventing the agent from saving is necessary for implement-
ing the optimal allocations. To see this, note that with one-sided moral hazard and
a risk neutral principal, the agent’s marginal utilities satisfy u0(ct) ≤ Etu0(ct+1).13
Since the agent places a greater value on the future consumptions than on the
current consumption, he would wish to save his income at the ﬁxed interest rate
r = 1/δ − 1. Therefore preventing the agent from saving is essential for imple-
menting the optimal allocations.
To draw comparison with this seminal result, in this model it is important
to distinguish between “external” and “internal” credit markets. External credit
markets allow agents to borrow or save outside their resource constraints; internal
credit markets on the other hand only allow the agents to borrow or save within the
group. In the principal-agent model with a risk-neutral principal, the distinction
between the two markets disappears because the agent would get the same lending
terms whether he deals with the principal or an outside lender; as a result, the
agent would face savings constraints in both markets. This is no longer true in
the current environment.
I shall show that optimal allocations may exhibit both savings and borrowing
constraints in the external market, but they always feature savings constraints in
the internal market.
Consider ﬁrst the external market. In this market the aggregate resource
constraints and the risk aversion of both agents play a bigger role than the incentive
constraints. For instance, suppose that the incentive constraints are all slack and
risk-sharing is at the ﬁrst-best (i.e. marginal utility ratio u0
i/u0
j is constant across
states and over time). Suppose at some history the agents are suddenly allowed to
borrow or save at the ﬁxed interest rate r = 1/δ−1. Clearly if the total output is at
the lowest level then agents’ consumptions are at their lowest levels; therefore both
agents would wish to borrow against their future incomes because their current
marginal utilities are at their highest levels: u0
i(ct) > Etu0
i(ct+1). On the other
hand, if the total output is at the highest level then both agents would like to save
because u0
i(ct) < Etu0
i(ct+1). Therefore, it appears that to implement optimal
allocations both borrowing and saving should be prevented in the external credit
markets. However, this observation should be interpreted cautiously. If there were
13This can be seen from Eq. (19): with u
0
i being constant, the result follows from Jensen’s
inequality.
25a risk-neutral outsider who does not have a moral hazard problem, does not face
resource constraints, and can oﬀer insurance to the agents, then there would be
no need for the agents to share the risks among themselves. Then the optimal
allocation in the current model would not be optimal in the ﬁrst place.
Consider next the internal credit market. Imagine that at some date after the
outputs are realized the agents are suddenly allowed to borrow or lend between
each other. In particular, suppose that agent 1 has all the bargaining power in
the sense that agent 1 may borrow (or save) some income worth one unit of agent
2’s utility and repay (or collect) an amount tomorrow worth 1/δ units of agent
2’s next-period utility so as to leave agent 2 indiﬀerent. In other words, agent 2’s
utility is used as the “currency” in this internal credit market, and agent 1 can
borrow or save at the ﬁxed interest rate r = 1
δ − 1 using this currency.
Proposition 6. At any history ht where the submartingale characterization (18)
holds for i = 1 and j = 2, holding eﬀorts unchanged if agent 1 is given the above
opportunity to borrow or save in the internal credit market through agent 2 then
he would prefer to save, and he would strictly prefer to save if (18) holds with
strict inequality.
Proof. If agent one saves some income worth one unit of agent two’s utility then the





agent one receives an amount worth 1/δ units of agent two’s utility in the next




















which is non-negative by the submartingale condition (18). Therefore the marginal
return of saving is nonnegative, hence agent one always has a (weak) desire to save
some of his income through agent 2 given the eﬀort choices. Obviously agent one
strictly prefers to save if (18) holds with strict inequality.15
Note that the apparent Pareto improvement resulted from the savings arrange-
ments in the internal market is not inconsistent with recursive optimality, because
this “improvement” is conditional on agents choosing the eﬀorts speciﬁed in the
original contract. Since the agents can freely adjust their eﬀort choices, the restric-
tion to saving may not be really necessary for implementing optimal allocations,
14Agent one’s utility as a function of u2 is given by u1 = u1(c1 + c2 − u
−1
2 (u2)) hence its













2 ) can take on two diﬀerent values
across output signals θ−2 for some signal θ2.
26at least if there are only two agents: if they know they have such savings oppor-
tunities the agents will ﬁnd the eﬀorts unattractive, and when they fully adjust
their eﬀorts accordingly their ex ante welfare can not be improved in a Pareto
sense because of recursive optimality.
However, if the group has more than two agents it can not be ruled out that two
of them can collude and engage in such savings arrangements at the expense of the
others, and therefore it may be necessary to restrict the agents from such saving
activities for the sake of implementing the optimal allocations. This consideration
is also relevant if the agents are able to commit to the eﬀort plans at the beginning.
Such commitments do not aﬀect the ex ante optimal contracts since incentive
compatibility only requires the eﬀort plans constitute a Nash equilibrium anyway;
but in this case in order to implement optimal allocations savings in the internal
credit market need be restricted even if there are only two agents.
By equation (19) and the preceding argument, an agent whose moral hazard
and limited commitment constraints are both nonbinding does not face a savings
or a borrowing constraint in the internal credit market.
In summary, putting aside the limited commitment issue, the robust ﬁnding
is that whenever an agent has a binding moral hazard constraint he faces savings
constraint in the internal credit market within the risk-sharing group. Viewed
through this lens, the result of [11] and [37] for the principal-agent model is a
special case of our result for the two-sided moral hazard model.
Next, consider what happens when the limited commitment constraint is bind-
ing. If there does not exist ﬁrst-best contracts for the static contracting problem
then we have the following result.
Lemma 10. Assume A1-A2, ci = 0, ∀i, and that no ﬁrst-best contract exists
for the static problem. If U1 > −∞ then for every optimal contract σ there is
some history ht at which agent 1’s limited commitment constraint is binding, i.e.
U1(σ|ht) = U1, and holding eﬀorts unchanged agent 1 strictly prefers to borrow
from agent 2 under the same lending terms as in Proposition 6.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus when his limited commitment constraint is binding an agent may face
borrowing rather than savings constraint. This restriction however is of a diﬀerent
nature and should not be interpreted on the par with the savings constraint. From
the eﬃciency point of view the restriction on borrowing is unnecessary, and in
fact counterproductive. It exists only to prevent the promised utility from falling
below Ui. Put it diﬀerently, it is not the eﬃciency consideration that imposes the
restriction on borrowing, rather it is the exogenous limited commitment constraint
that makes such restriction necessary: allowing borrowing will give agent i the
27chance to take the money and run, because at such a history his promised payoﬀ
would fall below the default payoﬀ Ui after he borrows from j. On a diﬀerent
note though, this distinction between borrowing and savings constraints provides
a means to test whether an agent’s limited commitment constraint is binding.
Finally, note that in the above discussion the borrowing and saving activities
are assumed to be observable and thus can be controlled by the mechanism. Al-
lowing private storage along the lines of Cole and Kocherlakota [9] would be an
interesting avenue for future research.
5 The Long-Run Behavior of Optimal Allocations
In this section I examine the behavior of optimal contracts in the long run. The
analysis generalizes the existing ﬁndings for one-sided moral hazard and for hidden
information economies.
First, the submartingale characterization has strong implications for the long-
run distribution, as given in the following proposition. Recall that when the agents
do not face limited commitment constraints the set of agent i’s incentive feasible
lifetime utilities is given by (−∞, Qi), where Qi is determined by Program Q
(letting agent i assume the role of agent 1) in Section 3.
Proposition 7. Assume A1-A2 and that default payoﬀs Ui = −∞, ∀i. We have,
(a) for every optimal contract, along almost all history path exactly one of the
following two situations occurs: (i) the consumption/utility distributions converge
to some ﬁrst-best outcome; (ii) each agent i’s expected lifetime utility diverges to
−∞ or converges to Qi or ﬂuctuates between them;
(b) if the consumption lower bound c2 = 0 and agent 1’s expected utility con-
verges to Q1, then agent 2’s expected utility diverges to −∞ and agents’ eﬀort
choices converge to some (ˆ a1,ˆ a2) that solve Program Q1. Moreover, if the prob-
ability distributions p2(·|a2) satisfy the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance condition
then ˆ a2 is the most productive implementable eﬀort of agent 2;
(c) if cj = −∞ and agent i’s expected utility converges to Qi < ∞ then agent
i’s eﬀort converges to the minimum level ai.
Proof. See Appendix.
The results in part (a) are somewhat sharper than that in Wang [46], where
it is only shown that agents’ expected utilities do not converge to any point in
the feasibility set but leaves open where they might go in the long run. Here it is
shown that when the incentive problem never goes away even if agents’ expected
utilities may not diverge for sure to the ends of the feasible sets, they almost surely
will ﬂuctuate towards these ends.
28According to part (b), in the long run an agent may get immiserated but yet
is induced to choose his most productive incentive compatible eﬀort. Therefore
optimal contracts generate a subgroup of “working poor” in the long run. Part
(c) describes the opposite possibility – an agent with suﬃciently high utility enti-
tlement may become a member of the “leisure class.”
In light of part (a) of Proposition 7, to focus on the eﬀects of moral hazard I
make the following assumption, which ensures that the moral hazard problem is
always present.
A4. In the static problem there does not exist a ﬁrst-best contract in which
the marginal utility ratio is constant across output realizations.
The next proposition deals with the situation when agents’ marginal utilities
satisfy certain boundary conditions, in which case the submartingales become
bounded and convergence can be obtained.
Proposition 8. Assume A1-A2, A4, and Ui = −∞ for both i. For i,j = 1,2 with
i 6= j, let Mi be the supremum of marginal utility ratio u0
i(ci)/u0
j(cj) for feasible
consumptions (ci,cj). We have,
(a) if Mj = ∞ and only agent i has an moral hazard problem then agent i’s
consumption and utility diverge to −∞ in the long run;
(b) if Mi < ∞,Mj = ∞ and only agent j has incentive problem then both
agents’ consumptions and utilities diverge to ∞ or −∞ with positive probabilities
respectively;
(c) if Mi < ∞ for i = 1,2 then both agents’ consumptions and expected utilities
diverge almost surely to ∞ or −∞ with positive probabilities respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that given assumption A2 (unbounded utility functions), if consumption
lower bound ci = 0 then u0
i(ci) = ∞ hence Mi = ∞. Therefore, part (b) and part
(c) are applicable only if ci = −∞ for at least one i. For instance, (b) applies to the
situation when u0
1(−∞) < ∞, u0
2(∞) > 0, and either u0
1(∞) = 0 or u0
2(−∞) = ∞;
and (c) applies to the situation when u0
i(−∞) < ∞, u0
i(∞) > 0 for both i. These
cases arise naturally when the agents have exponential utility functions or one of
them is risk neutral, and have been widely studied in the dynamic contracting
literature.16 It may be interpreted as agents taking on large amounts of debt from
each other.
Proposition 8 generalizes some of the existing ﬁndings in the one-sided moral
hazard models, including the repeated insurance problem between a risk neutral
principal and a risk averse agent who is subject to hidden endowment shocks
16For instance, see Green [18], Atkeson and Lucas [4], and Phelan [35].
29(Thomas and Worrall [41]; Green [18]) and the insurance problem between a
planner and a continuum of risk averse agents (Atkeson and Lucas [4]). In these
models, eﬃcient allocations have the feature that the agents are immiserated in
the long run.
In the current model of hidden action this can be seen heuristically from the
submartingale characterization. With one-sided moral hazard and a risk neutral
principal, the agent’s marginal utilities satisfy
u0(ct) ≤ Etu0(ct+1). (20)
Thus in optimal allocation the agent’s consumption and utility are front-loaded,
which explains why the agent gets immiserated in the long run. As Phelan [35]
points out, however, this result also depends on the condition that the inverse
of the agent’s marginal utility is unbounded. Phelan shows that in an hidden
endowment economy with a risk neutral planner and a continuum of ex ante
identical agents, if the agents’ marginal utilities are bounded away from zero then
in the long run the expected utility of a positive measure of the agents will diverge
to its upper limit and the utility of others will diverge to the lower limit.
With two-sided moral hazard, the submartingale characterizations do not pin
down the deﬁnite directions for the movements of utility and consumption. As
discussed in Section 4, each agent’s marginal utilities may satisfy either (20) or the
reverse inequality, depending upon the output history. In addition, if both agents
face the moral hazard constraints then the submartingale conditions imply that
the two marginal utility ratios both grow in expectation, which only demonstrates
the persistent ﬂuctuations in consumption and utility as shown in Proposition 7
part (a).
Nevertheless, the results in one-sided moral hazard can still be seen as special
cases of two-sided moral hazard. Part (a) of Proposition 8 generalizes [18], [41]
and [4] to a risk-averse principal, and part (b) generalizes [35] to the case of a
ﬁnite number of agents. Part (c) is new. It says that if both agents’ marginal
utilities are bounded away from zero when consumptions go to inﬁnity and are
bounded away from ∞ when consumptions go to −∞, then agents’ fates in the
long run are a priori indeterminate. This is in contrast to one-sided moral hazard
in part (a), where agents’ fates are completely predetermined by the identity of
the agent who faces the incentive constraints.
Finally, consider the situation when default payoﬀ Ui > −∞, i.e. agent i has
limited commitment to long-term contracting.17
17For example, a consumer may declare bankruptcy; a sovereign country can repudiate its
contractual obligations.
30The utility boundary Ui is a reﬂecting barrier if with positive probability
agent i’s lifetime utility is bounced back inside after hitting the boundary, i.e. for
any history ht at which Ui(σ|ht) = Ui there is some history (ht,θt+1) at which
Ui(σ|ht,θt+1) > Ui.
Proposition 9. Assume A1-A2, A4, and ci = 0, ∀i. If Ui > −∞ then in every
optimal contract with positive probability agent i’s expected utility hits its lower
boundary Ui in ﬁnite time, and the boundary is a reﬂecting barrier.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is not very surprising given the submartingale characterization.
It is related to the ﬁndings of Atkeson and Lucas [5] and Phelan [34]. In par-
ticular, [5] studies optimal unemployment insurance when the agent is subject
to unobservable employment risks; the agent can not trade all future rights to
consumption for current consumption and therefore has limited commitment to
long-term contracting. [34] considers a competitive insurance market where agents
endure private endowment shocks and can not legally commit not to walk away
from a contract that entails a level of utility below what can be obtained from
another insurer. In both of these studies, agents’ expected utilities are repeatedly
driven down to their lower boundaries.
It is perhaps worthwhile pointing out some of the diﬀerences between limited
commitment with moral hazard and the models of self-enforcing contracts with
symmetric information. In the latter models (see Thomas and Worrall [43], [42],
Kocherlakota [23], and Ray [36]), if the discount factor is low or if the autarkic
outcomes are suﬃciently attractive then autarky is the only self-enforcing outcome.
However, as shown in Corollary 2 in the current model autarky is never optimal.
Moreover, with symmetric information it has been found that the utility of
the agent without commitment grows over time, whence is “back-loaded” (e.g.
Thomas and Worrall [43], [42] and Ray [36]). This result to some extent is over-
turned in the moral hazard environment: an agent with limited commitment re-
peatedly hits his lower utility boundary.
This diﬀerence largely comes from the diﬀerent ways incentives are handled
in the two environments. With symmetric information, by back-loading the pay-
ments to the agent optimal contracts relax the commitment constraints over time;
in the meantime the eﬀort incentives can be provided by the current payments
and by the threat of punishment in the future, which however need not be carried
out in equilibrium. In contrast, when eﬀorts are hidden optimality requires that
the expected utilities of the agents continue to spread out. In particular the sub-
martingale characterization implies that there is always some downward movement
in expected utilities, which results in the agent repeatedly hitting his lower utility
31boundary. Note that in this model (as well as in [34] and [5]) one-period contracts
are assumed to be enforceable. This however is not essential for the diﬀerence,
because in repeated partnership games with hidden action (e.g. Abreu et al. [1])
agents have no commitment to one-period contracts but their expected utilities
still may hit the lowest levels with positive probabilities due to the bang-bang
nature of the sequential equilibrium strategies.
Finally, to illustrate the characterization results I compute an example using
the algorithm developed in Section 3. The example is parameterized as follows.
Each agent’s outputs take on two values, high = 5 and low = 0.5. For convenience
assume that each agent’s eﬀort is identiﬁed with the probability that the high
output will occur: a = Prob(output = 5). Each agent has the utility function
c1−σ/(1−σ)−g(a). Assume risk parameter σ = 2; discount factor δ = 0.98; g(a) =
50a2. In the computation I use polynomials to approximate the value functions.18
For feasibility in the computation the state variable (agent 1’s promised utility) U
is restricted to the interval [−100,−79.09] where −100 is the autarkic utility level
and −79.09 = Q1 − 70, where Q1 = −9.09 is the supremum on agent 1’s lifetime
utilities with full commitment.
I ﬁnd that the optimal value function is monotone decreasing and concave (Fig-
ure 1). To illustrate the possible dynamics of the optimal allocations, two sample
paths are computed for two diﬀerent scenarios. In each case, expected utility and
eﬀort paths are computed for 400 periods. In the ﬁrst case, the two agents start
with quite diﬀerent initial expected utilities, but they gradually converge after 400
periods (see Figure 2). In the second scenario, agents initially start with similar
expected utilities, but they grow apart over time (see Figure 3).
Along both sample paths, agents’ utilities and eﬀorts are negatively correlated,
illustrating the moral hazard problem; and they exhibit the phenomena of working-
poor and leisure-class. For instance, along the ﬁrst sample path agent 1 starts out
as a member of the leisure class: in the ﬁrst period his expected utility is above the
autarkic level and his eﬀort is below the optimal autarkic level (which is 0.036).
Over time, agent 1’s expected utility falls and his eﬀort rises. On the other hand,
agent 2 starts out as a working-poor with expected utility below the autarkic level
and eﬀort above the autarkic level. Over time agent 2’s expected utility gradually
rises accompanied by falling eﬀort levels. Moreover, after about 200 periods both
agents’ expected utilities are above the autarkic levels and their eﬀorts are below
the autarkic levels, showing that both risk sharing and moral hazard are at work.
18See Ljungqvist and Sargent [28] Chapter 3 for an introduction to numerically solving dynamic
programming problems using polynomial approximations.
32Figure 1: Value function V. x-axis: expected utility of agent 1.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied optimal risk-sharing in a dynamic model with two-sided
hidden eﬀorts. The contracting problem admits a recursive formulation, and the
optimal value function is the unique ﬁxed point of a contraction mapping opera-
tor despite the fact that the value function also appears in the constraints. The
recursive formulation and the algorithm should ﬁnd use in other applications of
the model. With additional assumptions on preferences and technologies optimal
contracts are recursively optimal: every continuation contract of an optimal con-
tract is itself optimal. Moreover, the marginal utility ratio between one agent and
another is a submartingale, which is a testable restriction against the alternative
assumption of one-sided moral hazard. The characterization results imply that
it is in general important to restrict an agent whose moral hazard constraint is
binding from saving through another agent within the risk-sharing group.
This paper contributes to the dynamic insurance literature by considering
multi-sided hidden eﬀorts as the main impediment to eﬃcient risk sharing as
opposed to hidden information or one-sided moral hazard. It remains to be seen
whether the method and results of this paper can be usefully extended to risk
sharing problems with capital accumulation.
33Figure 2: Sample path 1. Upper panel: eﬀort paths. Lower panel: expected
utility paths. ‘-.-.-’ = agent 1; ‘—’ = agent 2.
34Figure 3: Sample path 2. Upper panel: eﬀort paths. Lower panel: expected
utility paths. ‘-.-.-’ = agent 1; ‘—’ = agent 2.
35A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove part (a), let (ξn) → ξ and (yn) → y with ξn ∈ D and
yn ∈ V(ξn) for all n. Then there exists a sequence of incentive feasible contracts
(σ1,...,σn,...) with U1(σn) = ξn and U2(σn) = yn.
I shall construct a contract σ∗ with U1(σ∗) = ξ and U2(σ∗) = y. For this
purpose, I ﬁrst show that the sequence of consumptions (cn
i (ht)), prescribed by
contracts (σn) to agent i at each history ht 6= h0, is contained in some compact
interval.
By resource constraint (1), for all ht 6= h0, uj(cn
j (ht)) 6 uj(θ1 +θ2 −cn
i (ht)) 6
uj(¯ θ − cn
i (ht)), where ¯ θ ≡ maxθ(θ1 + θ2) is the maximum total output.
Since the strictly concave function f(z) ≡ uj(¯ θ−u−1
i (z)) is bounded from above
by some aﬃne functions f(z) ≤ α1z + β1, f(z) ≤ α2z + β2 with α1 < α2 < 0, for
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￿
≤ α1 (Ui(σn) + Gn
i ) + β1 + δt−1p(ˆ ht)
￿
(α2 − α1)ui(cn







j (ht)) is the discounted expected disutility of agent j,
and p(ˆ ht) is the ex ante probability that history ˆ ht will be reached.
By line (21), ui(cn
i (ˆ ht)) → −∞ implies Uj(σn) → −∞. Reversing the roles of
(α1,β1) and (α2,β2), one shows that ui(cn
i (ˆ ht)) → +∞ also implies Uj(σn) → −∞.
Neither is possible.
Therefore given resource constraint (1), the sequence of consumptions (cn
i (ht))
is contained in some interval [bi(ht),bi(ht)], for i = 1,2 and for all ht 6= h0.
Now I construct the desired contract σ∗. It is useful to decompose each agent
i’s payoﬀ from contract σn = (cn
i ,sn
i ) as follows:
Ui(σn) = Eh1[ui(cn
i (h1)) + δUi(σn|h1)] − gi(sn
i (h0)).
Since the sequence ((cn
i (h1)),sn
i (h0)) is contained in a compact set, it has a con-
vergent subsequence. Re-index the convergent subsequence as (cm
i (h1),sm
i (h0)),
36and denote the limit by ((c∗
i(h1)),s∗
i(h0)). Since U2(σm) = ym → y and U1(σm) =












i(h0)) satisfy the one-step incentive compatibility con-
straints with continuation payoﬀs (U∗
i (h1)).19
Consider next any history h1. By similar argument, we can ﬁnd a subsequence
(σq|h1) of continuation contracts (σm|h1) such that contingent consumptions at
each h2 converge to some (c∗
i(h2)), actions at h1 converge to some (s∗
i(h1)),
and Ui(σq|h2) converges to some U∗




i (h2))) satisfy the one-step incentive constraints and attain expected utility
U∗
i (h1). Continuing the process ad inﬁnitum, we obtain the new contract σ∗. By
construction, σ∗ is incentive feasible, U1(σ∗) = ξ and U2(σ∗) = y.
Finally, note that by choosing α2 = α1 < 0,β2 = β1, equation (21) implies
Uj(σ) + Gj ≤ α1(Ui(σ) + Gi) + β1.
Since Gi is bounded for each i, this proves part (b).
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider ﬁrst c2 = −∞, in which case
Q = (u1(∞) − g(a1))/(1 − δ).
Let q ≡ (u1(c1) − g(a1))/(1 − δ). If A2 is satisﬁed then q = −∞ and for every
ξ ∈ (q, Q), there is some c1 such that (u1(c1) − g(a1))/(1 − δ) = ξ; if A2’ is
satisﬁed then q = 0 and for every ξ ∈ [q, Q), there is some c1 such that (u1(c1) −
g(a1))/(1 − δ) = ξ. In either case, letting c2(θ) = θ1 + θ2 − c1 ∀θ and a2 be
any action implementable by such c2(θ), we obtain a stationary incentive feasible
contract that attains ξ for agent 1.
Consider next c2 = 0, in which case Q is deﬁned by (5). First, I show that
every incentive feasible contract delivers to agent 1 some expected utility less than
Q. By the deﬁnition of Q, at each history ht the contemporaneous expected utility




< (1 − δ)Q(s2(ht))
≤ (1 − δ)Q.
19This is to say Nash correspondence has a closed graph.
37It only remains to show that every ξ in (−∞, Q) (under assumption A2) or in
[0, Q) (under A2’) can be attained by some incentive feasible contract.
By the deﬁnition of Q, for every ￿ > 0 there exists some a∗
2 such that Q >
Q(a∗
2,1) > Q − ￿.
By the Theorem of the Maximum, Q(λ,a∗
2) is continuous in λ. Therefore there
exists λ∗ < 1 such that ξ∗ = Q(λ∗,a∗
2) > Q−￿. Moreover, if assumption A2’ holds,
then λ ∈ [0,1] and Q(0,a∗
2) = 0, and by continuity function Q(λ,a∗
2) attains all
values in interval [0, ξ∗]. If assumption A2 holds, then λ ∈ (−∞,1] (if c1 = −∞)
or λ ∈ (0,1] (if c1 = 0), and in either case by continuity function Q(λ,a∗
2) attains
all values in (u1(c1) = −∞, ξ∗].
To complete the proof, I only need to show that for every λ < 1 as long as ξ =
Q(λ,a∗
2) is deﬁned then there is an incentive feasible contract that delivers lifetime
utility ξ to agent 1. Let (a∗
1(λ),c∗
2(·)) be an optimal solution to Program Q(λ,a∗
2).
Then the consumption plan deﬁned by c2(θ) ≡ u−1
2 [u2(c∗
2(θ2)) − w], where w > 0
is suﬃciently large so that c2(θ) ≤ minθ(1 − λ)(θ1 + θ2), also implements action
a∗
2. Letting agent 1’s consumption c1(θ) = λ(θ1 + θ2), ∀θ, we obtain a desired
stationary incentive feasible contract.
Proof of Lemma 5. Let σ be a contract satisfying the hypothesis in the propo-
sition. If U2(σ|θ) < V (U1(σ|θ)) then replace σ|θ with some incentive feasible
contract σ0|θ such that U1(σ0|θ) = U1(σ|θ) and U2(σ0|θ) = V (U1(σ0|θ)) (the ex-
istence of such a σ0|θ is guaranteed by Lemma 2). Then reduce agent 2’s con-
sumption c2(θ) by an appropriate amount ￿(θ) so that the total expected utility
u2(c2(θ)−￿(θ))+δU2(σ0|θ) is equal to the original level u2(c2(θ))+δU2(σ|θ). The
result is a desired contract σ0.
Proof of Lemma 6. By Lemma 2, for every ξ ∈ D there is an optimal contract σ
with U1(σ) = ξ and U2(σ) = V (ξ), and by Lemma 5 the continuation contracts
(σ|θ) can be chosen so that U2(σ|θ) = V (U1(σ|θ)). This implies TV (ξ) ≥ V (ξ).
On the other hand, given ξ ∈ D, let (ai,(ci(θ)),(U(θ))) be a policy vector that
satisﬁes the constraints of (FE) and attains some value v in the objective function.
Then there is an incentive feasible contract σ = (ai,(ci(θ)),(σ|θ)), where for each θ
contract σ|θ attains payoﬀs (U(θ),V (U(θ))), such that U1(σ) = ξ and U2(σ) = v.
Therefore TV (ξ) ≤ V (ξ). Hence V is a ﬁxed point of T. The existence of value
function V (Lemma 2) guarantees that the sup in (FE) is attained at this ﬁxed
point.
Proof of Proposition 2. First I show that Tf ∈ B(S). Let [ξ, ξ ] ⊂ D∞ and
[ξ, ξ ] ⊃ S.
38By equation (7), given a feasible policy vector (ai,ci(·),U(·)), agent 1’s current




Since function f(z) ≡ u2(¯ θ − u−1
1 (z)), where ¯ θ = maxθ(θ1 + θ2), is strictly














Therefore Tf is bounded from above by f(K) − g(a2) + δ supf.
On the other hand, by the deﬁnitions of Q and Q(λ,a2) in (5) and (4), there
is some a∗
2 ∈ A2 such that Q > Q(1,a∗
2) > ξ. By the Theorem of the Maximum,
Q(λ,a∗
2) is continuous in λ. Therefore, there exists λ∗ < 1 such that Q(λ∗,a∗
2) = ξ
and for every ξ ∈ [ξ, ξ] ⊃ S there exists λξ < λ∗ with Q(λξ,a∗
2) = ξ.
Let (c2(θ)) be a consumption vector that implements a∗
2. Then for large w > 0
the consumption vector c∗
2(θ) ≡ u−1
2 [u2(c2(θ2)) − w] ≤ minθ(1 − λ∗)(θ1 + θ2) also
implements a∗
2. For all ξ ∈ S, let a∗
1(λξ) be an optimal solution to Program (4).
Then the policy vector (a∗
1(λξ), a∗
2, c1(θ) = λξ(θ1 + θ2), c∗
2(θ), U(θ) = ξ) satisﬁes
the constraints of (FE) for promised utility ξ ∈ S, and therefore







Hence Tf ∈ B(S).
By Blackwell’s suﬃciency theorem for a contraction mapping,20 one only need
prove that operator T satisﬁes monotonicity and discounting. Discounting can be
easily seen.
To prove monotonicity, let f,g ∈ B(S) with f ≤ g.
Fix ξ ∈ S. Given function f, suppose (ai,ci(·),U(·)) satisﬁes the constraints
in program (FE) and let φf be the corresponding value of the objective function.
I shall show that there exists a policy vector (ˆ ai,ˆ ci(·), ˆ U(·)) that satisﬁes the
constraints of program (FE) when f is replaced by g, and the corresponding value
of the objective function is at least as great as φf. It then would follow that
Tf(ξ) ≤ Tg(ξ) and the proof is complete.
20See Stokey, Lucas, with Prescott [40], Theorem 3.3 on page 54.
39The desired new policy is constructed as follows. First, replace f with g in
program (FE). With the initial policy (ai,ci(·),U(·)), the only constraint that
could be violated is (9).
Then for each θ with g(U(θ)) > f(U(θ)), reduce c2(θ) by an appropriate
amount so that agent 2’s expected utility at state θ remains unchanged:
u2(ˆ c2(θ)) + δg(U(θ)) = u2(c2(θ)) + δf(U(θ)).
Clearly, with the new policy (ai,ˆ ci(·),U(·)) all of the constraints are satisﬁed
and the value of the objective function exactly equals φf.
Lemma 11 below, which parallels Lemma 1, is used to prove Lemma 7.
For f ∈ Bu(S) and ξ ∈ S, deﬁne set F(ξ) ⊆ < as follows: y ∈ F(ξ) if and only
if there exists policy vector ρ ≡ (ai,ci(·),U(·)) satisfying (7) through (10) and










Note that F(ξ) is nonempty for all ξ ∈ S.21
Lemma 11. If A1 and either A2 or A2’ are satisﬁed, then (a) the correspondence
F : S ￿ < has a closed graph, i.e. for any two sequences (ξn) → ξ ∈ < and
(yn) → y ∈ < with ξn ∈ S and yn ∈ F(ξn) for all n, we have ξ ∈ S and y ∈ F(ξ);
(b) the image F(S) is bounded from above.
Proof of Lemma 11. The proof parallels that of Lemma 1. I will ﬁrst show F
has a closed graph; boundedness will follow in the process. Let (ξn) → ξ and
(yn) → y be as speciﬁed. Therefore there exists a sequence of incentive feasi-







To show that y ∈ F(ξ), I shall construct a policy ρ∗ with U1(ρ∗) = ξ and
U2(ρ∗) = y. For this purpose, I will show ﬁrst that the sequence of consumptions
(cn
i (θ)), prescribed by policies (ρn) at any θ, is contained in some compact interval.
By resource constraint (1), for all θ, uj(cn
j (θ)) 6 uj(θ1 + θ2 − cn
i (θ)) 6 uj(¯ θ −
cn
i (θ)), where ¯ θ ≡ maxθ(θ1 + θ2) is the maximum total output.
Since the strictly concave function v(z) ≡ uj(¯ θ − u−1
i (z)) is bounded from
above by two aﬃne functions, i.e. v(z) ≤ α1z+β1, v(z) ≤ α2z+β2 for some αi,βi
21Let U(θ) = ξ,∀θ. Then by the argument of Lemma 4, there exists one-period contract
(ai,ci(·)) that satisﬁes constraints (7) through (10).
40with α2 > α1, we have for an arbitrary ˆ θ,
Eθ[uj(cn






i (θ)) + β1] + p(ˆ θ|an)[α2ui(cn





i (θ)) + β1] + p(ˆ θ|an)[(α2 − α1)ui(cn
i (ˆ θ)) + β2 − β1]
6 α1Eθ[ui(cn
i (θ))] + β1 + p(ˆ θ|an)[(α2 − α1)ui(cn
i (ˆ θ)) + β2 − β1] (22)
By the last line (22), we have ui(cn
i (ˆ θ)) → −∞ implies Uj(ρn) → −∞. Revers-
ing the roles of (α1,β1) and (α2,β2), one shows that ui(cn
i (ˆ θ)) → +∞ also implies
Uj(ρn) → −∞. Neither is possible.
Therefore the sequence of consumptions (cn
i (θ)) is contained in some closed
interval [bi(θ),bi(θ)], for i = 1,2 and for all θ.
Now since the sequence (cn
i (·),an
i ) is contained within a compact set, it has a
convergent subsequence, re-indexed by m, with limit (c∗
i(·),a∗
i). Moreover, since
U2(ρm) = ym → y and U1(ρm) = ξm → ξ, it follows that for all θ, Um(θ) converges
to some limit U∗(θ) ∈ S with
Eθ[u1(c∗
1(θ)) + δU∗(θ)] − g1(a∗
1) = ξ
and f(Um(θ)) converges to some limit f∗(θ) with
Eθ[u2(c∗
2(θ)) + δf∗(θ)] − g2(a∗
2) = y.
Since f is upper semi-continuous, it follows f(U∗(θ)) > f∗(θ).
Clearly, (c∗
i(θ)), (a∗
i), U∗(θ), and f∗(θ) satisfy constraints (7) through (10). For
all θ if f(U∗(θ)) > f∗(θ) then reduce c∗






i,U∗(θ)) is a desired policy
vector.
Finally, by choosing α2 = α1,β2 = β1, equation (22) implies for any policy
ρ = (ci(·),ai,U(·)),
Eθ[u2(c2(θ))] 6 α1Eθ[u1(c1(θ))] + β1.
Since f and disutility function g2 are all bounded, part (b) is proven.
Proof of Lemma 7. Part (a) follows because by Lemma 11 in the Appendix, for
ξ ∈ S set F(ξ) is closed and bounded from above and Tf(ξ) = maxF(ξ).
Let (ξn) → ξ ∈ S with ξn ∈ S and yn = Tf(ξn) for all n. By Lemma
11, the sequence (yn) is bounded from above and limsup(yn) ∈ F(ξ). Therefore
Tf(ξ) ≥ limsup(yn), showing Tf is upper semi-continuous.
41Proof of Proposition 3. It is clear that S1 ⊆ S0 is closed hence compact. Since f1
is generated by the restriction of f0 to S1 but f0 is generated by f0 (f0 = Tf0),
then f1(ξ) 6 f0(ξ) for all ξ ∈ S1. Now suppose for k > 1, Sk ⊆ Sk−1 is compact and
fk(ξ) 6 fk−1(ξ), ∀ξ ∈ Sk. Then Sk+1 ⊆ Sk is closed hence compact. Since fk+1
is generated by the restriction of fk to Sk+1, fk is generated by fk−1 restricted to
Sk ⊇ Sk+1, and fk 6 fk−1 on Sk, it follows that for all ξ ∈ Sk+1, fk+1(ξ) 6 fk(ξ).
Therefore (Sk) is a nested decreasing sequence of compact subsets of < so it must
converge to some nonempty compact set ˆ S, and for all ξ ∈ ˆ S, the decreasing
sequence (fk(ξ)) must converge to some limit f(ξ). Restricted to domain ˆ S, the
sequence (fk) converges to f uniformly (i.e. in sup metric), therefore f is upper
semi-continuous since fk ∈ Bu(ˆ S) for all k and Bu(ˆ S) is closed.
Let ˆ f be the unique ﬁxed point of operator T deﬁned by (FE) on space B(ˆ S). I
shall show f = ˆ f. For a given ξ ∈ ˆ S, let ρk = (ck
i (θ),ak
i ,Uk(θ)) be a policy vector
that attains fk(ξ). By similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 11, the sequence
(ρk) is contained in some compact subset of a Euclidean space therefore has a
convergent subsequence, re-indexed as (ρm), with limit ρ∗ = (c∗
i(θ),a∗
i,U∗(θ)).
Moreover, since U2(ρm) = fm(ξ) → f(ξ) and U1(ρm) = ξ, ∀m, it follows that
Eθ[u1(c∗
1(θ)) + δU∗(θ)] − g1(a∗
1) = ξ
and for all θ, f(Um(θ)) converges to some limit f∗(θ) with
Eθ[u2(c∗
2(θ)) + δf∗(θ)] − g2(a∗
2) = f(ξ).
Since f is upper semi-continuous, it follows f(U∗(θ)) > f∗(θ).
Clearly, (c∗
i(θ)), (a∗
i), U∗(θ), and f∗(θ) satisfy constraints (7) through (10)
when f∗(θ) is in place of f(U∗(θ)) in (9). For all θ with f(U∗(θ)) > f∗(θ), reduce
c∗






i,U∗(θ)) is a policy vector that attains f(ξ) given f as the
continuation function. It follows that Tf(ξ) ≥ f(ξ). Hence Tkf ≥ Tk−1··· ≥ f
for all k ≥ 1. Therefore ˆ f ≥ f as Tkf → ˆ f.
On the other hand, let ˆ fk be the restriction of fk to ˆ S. Then for all ξ ∈ ˆ S,
T ˆ fk(ξ) 6 fk+1(ξ) = ˆ fk+1(ξ). Therefore Tk ˆ f0 6 Tk−1 ˆ f1 ··· 6 ˆ fk, ∀k ≥ 1. Since
Tk ˆ f0 → ˆ f and ˆ fk → f, then ˆ f ≤ f.
It only remains to show ˆ S = D. For every ξ ∈ ˆ S, one can construct in the
standard way an incentive compatible contract σ, with U1(σ) = ξ, that satisﬁes the
resource constraints and the limited commitment constraints Ui(σ) > Ui: there
exists a policy vector (ci(θ),ai,U(θ)) that generates payoﬀ pair (ξ,f(ξ)); the tuple
(ci(θ),ai) will be the ﬁrst-period component of σ. Then the policy vector that
generates each U(θ) will provide the next-period components of σ conditional
on history θ. Continuing with the process indeﬁnitely, we obtain contract σ.
42Therefore ˆ S ⊆ D. On the other hand, since D ⊆ S0, then f0 > V > U2 on set D
hence D ⊆ S1. Since f1 is generated by f0 restricted to S1 and V is generated by V
deﬁned on D, it follows that f1 > V > U2 on D therefore D ⊆ S2. Continuing the
process ad inﬁnitum, we have D ⊆ Sk for all k. Therefore D ⊆ ˆ S, the intersection
of all Sk. It follows ˆ S = D.


























j). The idea is to construct a Pareto superior new
contract by reshuﬄing agents’ consumption/utility across states, which would be
a contradiction to optimality.
Denote by zi(θi,θj) the utility agent i receives at state (θi,θj) and by zi(θi)
the expected utility agent i receives conditional on output θi.
In the ﬁrst round of reshuﬄing, choose small ￿ > 0 and ￿0 > 0 as the utility
transfers between the two agents so that the resulted utilities are given as follows:












where ￿ > 0 and ￿0 > 0 are chosen such that
pj(θj)￿ = pj(θ0
j)￿0.
The eﬀects of this round of reshuﬄing are two: First, because at least one of
ui(·) is strictly concave, the above procedure leads to increased payoﬀs for agent
j conditional on θj and θ0
j, i.e. there exist η > 0 and η0 > 0 such that




To see this, note that agent j’s utility as a function of agent i’s utility zi is given
by
wj(zi) ≡ uj(θi + θj − u−1
i (zi)),







43The second eﬀect is that agent i’s expected payoﬀs are unchanged conditional
on his own output levels θi and θ0
i. To see this, note that because pj(θj)￿ = pj(θ0
j)￿0,
it follows that




So agent i’s incentive is unaﬀected.
To smooth out agent j’s incentive, reshuﬄe agents’ consumption/utility one
more round as follows. For θj, and for all ˆ θi ∈ Θi, increase agent i’s payoﬀ by
same amount ϕ:
˜ ˜ zi(ˆ θi,θj) = ˜ zi(ˆ θi,θj) + ϕ
where ϕ > 0 is chosen such that
˜ ˜ zj(θj) = zj(θj).
Similarly, for θ0
j, for all ˆ θi ∈ Θi, increase agent i’s payoﬀ by an equal amount ϕ0:
˜ ˜ zi(ˆ θi,θ0
j) = ˜ zi(ˆ θi,θ0
j) + ϕ0




Clearly, after this round of reshuﬄing, agents’ incentives are not aﬀected from
the current period onwards and agent j’s continuation payoﬀ remains the same
as under the initial contract, but agent i’s continuation payoﬀ is increased (by
pj(θj)ϕ + pj(θ0
j)ϕ0 > 0). This contradicts the optimality of the continuation con-
tract starting from the current period.
Proof of Lemma 9. First, by assumption A2 the ﬁrst constraint of (FE) can be
written as weak inequality with the left-hand side > right-hand side. This is valid
because by Lemma 3 the constraint must hold with equality in optimal solutions.
For given promised utility ˆ U, let (a∗
1,a∗
2,c∗
1(·),U∗(·)) be an optimal solution to
program (FE). Then given the vector (a∗
1,a∗
2,U∗(·)), c∗
1(·) maximizes the objective
function subject to the ﬁrst three sets of constraints. It follows that there are
multipliers λ ≥ 0, µa1 ≥ 0 and µa2 ≥ 0, such that the ﬁrst-order necessary
condition for c∗


































2(θ) ≡ θ1 + θ2 − c∗


































By assumption A3 and the hypothesis of the Proposition, the right-hand side
of condition (23) is nondecreasing in θ1. If I can show that for all θ2,

















1(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ1, which in turn will imply that
c∗
1(θ1,θ2) is nondecreasing in θ1 for each given θ2.
First of all, G(θ2) 6= 0 for all θ2, because then ﬁrst-order condition (23) can
not be satisﬁed. Secondly, either G(θ2) > 0 for all θ2 or G(θ2) < 0 for all θ2.
If there are θ0
2, θ00
2 with G(θ0
2) < 0 and G(θ00





1(θ)) is nondecreasing in θ1 for θ00
2 but is nonincreasing in θ1 for θ0
2,
which is impossible by Lemma 8. Hence all I need is to prove G(θ2) > 0 for some
θ2.
Let ¯ θ2 be the highest output level for agent 2. By assumption for each a2 with
µa2 > 0, g(a2) < g(a∗
2). Then by assumption A3, p(¯ θ2|a2)/p(¯ θ2|a∗
2) ≤ 1. It follows
that G(¯ θ2) > 0. This proves the desired result for agent 1. Similar argument will
show that c∗
2(θ1,θ2) is nondecreasing in θ2.
Proof of Proposition 5 Continued. To prove the last sentence of the main proof in
the text, let λ be the multiplier for constraint (13) and µ(θ1) be the multiplier
for (14) for each θ1 ∈ Θ1. The ﬁrst order necessary condition of problem (15),23
evaluated at (ε = 0,η = 0,(νk = 0)) is given as:
For ε : δ −
X
θ1
µ(θ1) = 0 (24)







+ λ = 0 (25)









22This condition resembles the standard characterization of optimal wage contracts for the sta-
tic principal-agent problem (see Holmstrom (1979) or Grossman and Hart (1983)). The diﬀerence
here is that each agent’s likelihood ratio enters into one side of the equation.
23The full rank constraint qualiﬁcation condition holds for this problem. The Jacobi matrix of
the constraint functions evaluated at the zero vector is essentially a diagonal matrix with positive
diagonal elements.























Then using equations (24) and (25), one obtains the desired Eq. (12).
Proof of Corollary 1. The result follows from equation (12) by Jensen’s inequality
if none of the limited commitment constraints is binding. Now consider a history
at which agent 1’s continuation utility U1(σ|ht) = U1. The variation method
used in the proof of Proposition 5 should only allow a reduction in the current
consumption of agent 1 and an increase in his next-period consumption, so that
agent 1 will not be promised a continuation utility less than U1. This means that
in Problem (15) the constraint ε ≥ 0 (which is the variation in agent 1’s lifetime













































However at this boundary U1 this type of argument can not establish that
u0
1t/u0
2t will be a submartingale.
Proof of Lemma 10. Suppose to the contrary such a history does not exist there-
fore by Proposition 6 agent 1 (weakly) prefers to save at all histories ht, t ≥ 1. It















46Given ci = 0 ∀i, agents’ consumptions are bounded from above by total output
hence u0
2 is bounded away from zero. Also, given that agent 1’s expected utility
is bounded within (U1, Q) and Q < ∞, his consumption has to be bounded
away from c1 = 0 hence u0
1 is bounded from above. Therefore, the ratio u0
1t/u0
2t
is a bounded submartingale hence converges almost surely. By the argument in
Proposition 7, along almost all sample paths the contract converges to some ﬁrst-
best stationary contract, which is impossible.
Proof of Proposition 7. Part (a). I develop some necessary terminologies ﬁrst.
Fix an optimal contract σ = (ci,si). The pair of action plans (si) induces a
probability space (Ω,F,P), where Ω ≡ Θ×Θ··· is the set of all inﬁnite histories
ω = (θ1,θ2,...) and P is the product measure on Ω, induced by the action plans
(si). Let Xt denote random variable u0
1t/u0
2t. Then (Xt)∞
t=1 is a submartingale
with respect to the ﬁltration (Ft)∞
t=1 generated by (Xt)∞
t=1.
Note that (ii) means P[Xt(ω) ∈ [α, β],∀t] = 0 for all 0 < α < β < ∞.
First, suppose there exist 0 < α < β < ∞ such that P[Xt(ω) ∈ [α, β],∀t] = 1.
Then (Xt) is a bounded submartingale therefore converges almost surely to some
random variable Y . Since there are countable sample paths ω, the support
of Y is countable. Consider some y ∈ [α,β] such that P[A] = p > 0 with
A = {ω | limt→∞ Xt(ω) = y}, i.e. there is a positive measure of sample paths
converging to y. For all ￿ > 0, deﬁne event At = {ω |Xτ ∈ B￿(y),∀τ ≥ t} with
B￿(y) = (y − ￿,y + ￿). Then there is a T = T(￿) such that P[AT] > 0. As
P[AT] = P[XT ∈ B￿(y)]···P[At | Xτ ∈ B￿(y),∀T ≤ τ < t] > 0,
the conditional probability P[At | Xτ ∈ B￿(y),∀T ≤ τ < t] must converge to 1.
Therefore for almost all ω = (ht,θt+1,···) ∈ AT, the sample paths of continuation
process (Xτ,τ > t|ht) are almost surely bounded within B￿(y) as t → ∞. Since
A ⊆ AT(￿) for all ￿ > 0, letting ￿ → 0 we have for almost all ω = (ht,θt+1,···) ∈ A,
as t → ∞, (Xτ,τ ≥ t|ht) converges to y along almost all of the continuation
sample paths from ht. In other words, the continuation contracts σ|ht converge to
the stationary ﬁrst-best contract that entails constant marginal utility ratio equal
to y.
Now suppose there exist 0 < α < β < ∞ such that P[A] > 0 with A =
{ω |α ≤ Xt(ω) ≤ β, ∀t}. Deﬁne the event At = {ω |Xτ(ω) ∈ [α, β], ∀τ ≥ t}.
Clearly, A ⊆ A1 ⊆ ···. Since for all t,
P[A] = P[α ≤ Xτ ≤ β]···P[At |α ≤ Xτ ≤ β,∀1 ≤ τ < t] > 0,
it follows that the conditional probability P[At |α < Xτ < β,∀1 ≤ τ < t] goes
to 1 as t → ∞. Therefore for almost all ω = (ht,θt+1,···) ∈ A, the continuation
47process (Xτ,τ > t|ht) is almost surely a bounded submartingale as t → ∞. Then
by the argument above, along almost all sample path ω ∈ A the continuation
contracts converge to some stationary ﬁrst-best contract.
Part (b). Since c2 = 0, Q is determined by Program Q that is deﬁned by
(4) and (5). Let (ˆ a1,ˆ a2) be a solution to Program Q. Suppose there is an
implementable action a0
2 that is more productive than ˆ a2. Then by hypoth-
esis p(·|a0
2) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates p(·|ˆ a2). Therefore for each θ1,
P
θ2 u1 (λ(θ1 + θ2))p2(θ2|a0
2) >
P
θ2 u1 (λ(θ1 + θ2))p2(θ2|ˆ a2). By Eqs. (4) and (5),
agent 1’s utility can be increased by replacing ˆ a2 with a0
2, which contradicts the
deﬁnition of Q.
Part (c). If cj = −∞ then by deﬁnition (Section 2) Qi = (ui(∞)−g(ai))/(1−δ),
where ai is agent i’s minimum eﬀort. Clearly if Qi < ∞ and agent i’s expected
utility converges to Qi then agent i’s consumption ci must diverge to ∞ and his
eﬀort must converge to the minimum level ai.
Proof of Proposition 8. I will use the following Lemma, which is a version of the
Doob martingale convergence theorem.24
Lemma 12. Let (Xt)∞
t=1 be a nonnegative submartingale. If limt→∞ E(Xt)< ∞,
then there exists a random variable X such that limt→∞ Xt = X almost surely
and E(X) ≤ limt→∞ E(Xt). If further there exists some M such that Xt < M
almost surely for all t, then E(X) = limt→∞ E(Xt).
(a). Note that if only agent i has incentive problem, then the process {u0
jt/u0
it}




i1) for all t. By the above
Lemma it must converge almost surely to some random variable X ≥ 0. Since
incentive problem never disappears, by similar argument as in the proof of Propo-
sition 7 it can be shown the probability that X belongs in some open interval
(α,β) ⊂ <+ is equal to zero. It follows that X = 0 with probability one. There-
fore agent i’s consumption and expected utility diverge to −∞ in the long run.
(b). For concreteness, suppose M1 < ∞, M2 = ∞. In this case marginal utility
ratios Xt ≡ u0
1t/u0
2t are uniformly bounded. By Lemma 12, Xt converges to some
random variable X, and E(X) = limt→∞ E(Xt). Since incentive problem never
disappears, again by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 7 it can be
shown that for almost all sample path ω the limit X(ω) is either equal to M1 or
equal to 0. There are then two possibilities: either X = M1 with probability one
or it equals M1 and zero with positive probabilities respectively. Which one of
24The ﬁrst half of Lemma 12 is standard; see Billingsley [7] (p. 468). The second half follows
from the fact that if the sequence (Xt) is uniformly bounded then it is uniformly integrable. See
Fristedt and Gray [14] Theorem 20 (p. 480) for the convergence theorem and Deﬁnition 11 (p.
108) for uniform integrability.
48these two possibilities will materialize depends upon the details of the model, in
particular the conﬁguration of incentive constraints. Suppose as in (b) that agent
2 is the only agent with moral hazard problem, then (Xt) is a martingale and the
limit variable X satisﬁes E(X) = limt→∞ E(Xt) = E(X1) < M1, which implies
that X takes on both M1 and zero with positive probabilities.
(c). Now suppose M1 and M2 are both ﬁnite. Then both submartingales
(Xt = u0
1t/u0
2t) and (Yt = u0
2t/u0
1t) converge almost surely to some random vari-
ables X and Y respectively, with E(X) = limt→∞ E(Xt) ≥ E(X1) and E(Y ) =
limt→∞ E(Yt) ≥ E(Y1). Again because incentive problem never dies out, the limit
variable X will only take on two values: M1 or 1/M2, and Y will only take on two
values: M2 or 1/M1. Moreover both X and Y must take on their two alternative
values with positive probabilities respectively. The reason is simple: if X = M1
with probability one then Y = 1/M1 with probability one, which would contradict
E(Y ) ≥ E(Y1) > 1/M1; similarly Y = M2 is also impossible. So in this case both
agents will have positive probabilities to become the winner who will consume all
the output as t → ∞.
Proof of Proposition 9. By Corollary 1, u0
1t/u0
2t is a submartingale as long as agent
1’s utility does not hit the boundary U1. Moreover the submartingale is bounded
because agent 1’s consumption must be bounded away from the lowest level c
given that agent 1’s continuation utility must lie in the ﬁnite interval [U1, Q1)
(recall that Q1 is the supremum of agent 1’s lifetime utility).
Given the optimal contract, for each promised utility v for agent 1, let R(v)
be the vector of marginal utility ratios u0
1/u0
2 in the next period and let M(v)
be equal to the maximum component of vector R(v), and let W(v) be the corre-
sponding continuation utility of agent 1. Starting from initial utility v0 for agent 1,
recursively deﬁne vt = W(vt−1), rt = M(vt−1), and rt = R(vt−1). Suppose agent
1’s utility does not hit the boundary in ﬁnite time. Then we have a bounded
monotone increasing sequence (r1,r2,...) with rt ≤ Et[rt+1] because u0
1t/u0
2t is a
bounded non-degenerate submartingale. The sequence (rt) must converge to some
limit r∗, whence (rt) converges to the vector whose components are all equal to
r∗. The corresponding utility sequence (v0,v1,...) is bounded so it must have a
subsequence that converges to some limit v∗. Together this would imply that for
promised utility v∗ to agent 1, the optimal contract entails a constant marginal
utility ratio across current output signals. This contradicts the assumption that
such ﬁrst-best outcome is not possible.
If the boundary is not a reﬂecting barrier, then we would have an optimal
contract that consists of a sequence of stationary one-period contracts, which is
impossible by Corollary 2.
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